The
Ministry of Defence (MoD) appears to have rejected the proposal of the Naresh
Chandra Committee on Defence Reforms to appoint a permanent Chairman of the
Chiefs of Staff Committee (CoSC). This is a retrograde step as the proposal
itself is a watered down version of the original recommendation of the Group of
Ministers (GoM) of 2001 to appoint a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS).
For
many decades, defence planning in India has been marked by knee jerk reactions
to emerging situations and haphazard single-Service growth. The absence of a
clearly enunciated national security strategy, poor civil-military relations,
the lack of firm commitment of funds for modernisation beyond the current
financial year and sub-optimal inter-service prioritisation, have handicapped
defence planning. Consequently, the defence planning process has failed to
produce the most effective force structure and force mix based on carefully
drawn up long-term priorities. With projected expenditure of US$ 100 billion on
military modernisation over the next 10 years, it is now being realised that
force structures must be configured on a tri-Service, long-term basis to meet
future threats and challenges.
In
1999, the Kargil Review Committee headed by the late Mr. K Subrahmanyam had
been asked to “…review the events leading up to the Pakistani aggression in the
Kargil District of Ladakh in Jammu & Kashmir; and, to recommend such
measures as are considered necessary to safeguard national security against
such armed intrusions." Though it had been given a very narrow and limited
charter, the committee looked holistically at the threats and challenges and
examined the loopholes in the management of national security. The committee
was of the view that the “political, bureaucratic, military and intelligence
establishments appear to have developed a vested interest in the status quo.''
It made far reaching recommendations on the development of India’s nuclear
deterrence, higher defence organisations, intelligence reforms, border
management, the defence budget, the use of air power, counter-insurgency operations,
integrated manpower policy, defence research and development, and media
relations. The committee’s report was tabled in Parliament on February 23,
2000.
The
Cabinet Committee on Security appointed a GoM to study the Kargil Review
Committee report and recommend measures for implementation. The GoM was headed
by the then Home Minister L K Advani and, in turn, set up four task forces on
intelligence reforms, internal security, border management and defence
management to undertake in-depth analysis of various facets of the management
of national security.
The
GoM recommended sweeping reforms to the existing national security management
system. On May 11, 2001, the CCS accepted all its recommendations, including
one for the establishment of the post of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) –
which has still not been implemented. The CCS approved the following key
measures:
·
Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) was
established with representation from all the Services. The DG DPS was merged in
it.
·
The post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), whose
tasks include inter-Services prioritisation of defence plans and improvement in
jointmanship among the three Services, was approved. However, a CDS is yet to
be appointed.
·
A tri-Service Andaman and Nicobar Command and a
Strategic Forces Command were established.
·
The tri-Service Defence Intelligence Agency
(DIA) was established under the COSC for strategic threat assessments.
·
Speedy decision making, enhanced transparency
and accountability were sought to be brought into defence acquisitions.
Approval of the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP 2002) was formally
announced.
·
The DPP constituted the Defence Acquisition
Council (DAC) and the Defence Technology Board, both headed by the Defence
Minister.
·
Implementation of the decisions of the DAC was
assigned to the Defence Procurement Board (DPB).
·
The National Technical Research Organisation
(NTRO) was set up.
·
The CCS also issued a directive that India’s
borders with different countries be managed by a single agency – “one border,
one force” and nominated the CRPF as India’s primary force for
counter-insurgency operations.
Decision
making is gradually becoming more streamlined. The new Defence Planning
Guidelines have laid down three inter-linked stages in the planning process:
·
15 years Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan
(LTIPP), to be drawn up by HQ IDS in consultation with the Services HQ and
approved by the DAC.
·
Five Years Defence Plans for the Services
(current plan: 2007-12), including 5-years Services Capital Acquisition Plan
(SCAP), to be drawn up by HQ IDS in consultation with the Services HQ and
approved by the DAC.
·
Annual Acquisition Plan (AAP), to be drawn up by
HQ IDS approved by the DPB. Budgetary allocations for ensuing the financial
year (ending March) are made on the basis of the AAP.
Ten
years later, many lacunae still remain in the management of national security.
The lack of inter-ministerial and inter-departmental coordination on issues
like border management and centre-state disagreements over the handling of
internal security are particularly alarming. In order to review the progress of
implementation of the proposals approved by the CCS in 2001, the government
appointed a Task Force on National Security led by Mr. Naresh Chandra, former
Cabinet Secretary. The task force has submitted its report, which has been sent
for inter-ministerial consultations.
Conclusion
A
fluid strategic environment, rapid advances in defence technology, the need for
judicious allocation of scarce budgetary resources, long lead times required
for creating futuristic forces and the requirement of synergising plans for
defence and development, make long-term defence planning a demanding exercise.
The lack of a cohesive national security strategy and defence policy has
resulted in inadequate political direction regarding politico-military
objectives and military strategy. Consequently, defence planning in India had
till recently been marked by ad hoc decision making to tide over immediate
national security challenges and long-term planning was neglected. This is now
being gradually corrected and new measures have been instituted to improve
long-term planning.
It
is now being increasingly realised that a Defence Plan must be prepared on the
basis of a 15-year perspective plan. The first five years of the plan should be
very firm (Definitive Plan), the second five years may be relatively less firm
but should be clear in direction (Indicative Plan), and the last five years
should be tentative (Vision Plan). A reasonably firm allocation of financial
resources for the first five years and an indicative allocation for the
subsequent period is a pre-requisite.
Perspective
planning is gradually becoming tri-Service in approach. It is now undertaken in
HQ IDS, where military, technical and R&D experts take an integrated view
of future threats and challenges based on a forecast of the future battlefield
milieu, evaluation of strategic options and analysis of potential technological
and industrial capabilities. Issues like intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance, air defence, electronic warfare and amphibious operations,
which are common to all the Services, are now getting adequate attention.
However, unless a CDS is appointed to guide integrated operational planning, it
will continue to be mostly single-Service oriented in its conceptual framework.
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