Have
we learned any lessons from our experiences during the Nehru era and in
subsequent years? Anyone looking dispassionately at our defence and security
policies over the decades would respond only in the negative.
India
frittered away its militarily advantageous position towards the end of
Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 when we failed to exploit the operational situation
in the Western Front that could have given us back our territory. This was much
like towards the end of 1947-48 Indo-Pak conflict when Indian forces were
ordered to stop operations. After the cessation of hostilities in 1971, we
allowed Pakistan a victory on the negotiating table when India could have at
least forced Pakistan’s Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the Simla
Agreement of 1972, to convert the cease fire line into a permanent border as we
had over 90,000 Pakistani soldiers in our custody.
Some
specious response from Bhutto as to what face will he show to Pakistani public
was accepted as a justified explanation. Our politico-bureaucratic psyche
apparently is averse to following hard policy choices in pursuit of our well
cherished and identifiable national interests. Leeway given to Bhutto then and
his single minded pursuit of building an Islamic bomb that was successful has
created more obstacles for settling the Kashmir issue favourably from the Indian
point of view.
Like
Nehru allowed Sheikh Abdullah and his cohorts to travel to Pakistan and
exchange views with the Pakistani leadership, we continue to show irrational
leniency to the separatist Hurriyat leadership and other hostile and
anti-national elements to not only confer with officials of Pakistan’s High
Commission in New Delhi but also to travel to Pakistan, obviously for purposes
that would be contrary to India’s national interests.
It
is a well known fact that such Kashmiri leaders have met those very leaders who
sponsor terrorism both in Kashmir and all over India. It needs to be remembered
that Sheikh Abdullah, in what is known as Kashmir Conspiracy case, was charged
with treason for arranging to supply arms and explosives sourced from Pakistan
as part of a conspiracy against the State. Despite the proof presented to Nehru
about the involvement of Sheikh Abdullah in the conspiracy, he got him released
and allowed him to Pakistan under the mistaken belief that something good might
come out of the visit.
Currently,
the present government is again inclined to follow soft policies towards
Pakistan based on professions of peace by the newly elected Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif knowing very well that Pakistan’s India and Afghanistan policies
are dictated by the military and security establishment. Plans by Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh to visit Pakistan based on the invitation extended by
Nawaz Sharif have not been entirely discarded even as India has been waiting
for Islamabad to deliver on the masterminds of 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attacks.
It is quite evident that there has been no fundamental change in perceptions of
Pakistani establishment that it is only cross-border terrorism that moves India
to engage with Pakistan and possibly give some concessions to them especially
on Kashmir.
While
India has somehow managed to handle military and security threats from
Pakistan, it is the ever expanding Pakistan-China nexus that presents an
invidious and most dangerous threat to India’s security. It is only a few years
back that the Indian Army started propagating a military doctrine to meet the
threat of two front war. In a throwback to the Nehruvian policies, the
government was more inclined to handle such threats diplomatically rather than
spend additional defence funds for arising and equipping of requisite military
formations and necessary air support.
The
report ‘Non Alignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in Twenty
First Century’ authored by a group of eminent experts, that included a member
from National Security Advisor (NSA) Shiv Shankar Menon’s staff and where NSA
also attended some of the deliberations of the group, while talking about
military capabilities has opined that “we need to be clear about what kinds of
offensive capabilities will be useful. The prevailing assumption that we should
raise and deploy a 'mountain strike corps' against China is problematic. For it
simply risks replicating all the problems with our existing strike corps under
worse geographic and logistic conditions.” 1 In short, it is not only the
economic burden of raising such forces but the mindset about provoking China
redolent of Nehru era persists. The report also talks of instigating an
insurgency in our areas after they have been captured by the Chinese forces
which conveys a defeatist attitude.
Further,
what needs to be noticed is that since 2008 not only PLA has improved its
posture in Tibet it has undertaken a number of incursions across the Line of
Actual Control. This stance of assertive PLA in Tibet has been made possible by
the massive build up of logistic structure in Tibet to include extensive
railway network and over 58,000 kilometres of roads. The roads have been built
up to Indian borders and have also penetrated Nepal. This would ensure smooth induction
of the PLA troops in any contingency. This contrasts with our poor civil and
military structure even after a lapse of over six decades. No doubt India has
recently embarked on activating its old airfields along Sino-Indian border and
the MOD has chalked out a plan for building extensive road net work and other
infrastructure facilities but our record in implementing plans and projects has
so far been very tardy. Thus the asymmetrical situation with China that existed
in past during Nehruvian times and thereafter has not been rectified.
Recent
incursions by the PLA in Depsang and Chumar areas of Ladakh sector also reveals
the government’s disinclination to reveal such incidents along the border to
the public which conforms to its past practice of withholding such information
from the public lest it may embarrass the government in some manner or the
other. Apparently, Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid and later Defence Minister
Mr. AK Antony have visited Beijing subsequent to these incidents in April and
June 2013 which seemed from all angles as conciliatory gestures to China’s
aggressive policies in line with appeasement policies of Nehru.
The
deficiencies in terms of both military capabilities and defence equipment
continue to plague our forces. Shortage of basic wherewithal like ammunition
deficiencies, need for improvement of ammunition dumps et al as brought out by
the current and previous Army Chiefs, continue to persist. There are large
scale voids which have also been described as ‘critical hollowness’ in the army
that includes tanks running out of ammunition, obsolete air defence systems and
lack of essential weaponry, and lack of critical surveillance and
night-fighting capabilities for infantry and special forces. There is an
inadequate HUMINT in the border areas and depth and breadth of ELINT, COMINT
and satellite cover for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance needs to
be enhanced.
There
have been some improvements in defence organization, structures and processes
but the civil-military relations leave lot to be desired. Similarly, there is a
lack of integration and jointness in our armed forces. Even though Naresh
Chandra’s Task Force in their report recommended the institution of the post of
a Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, the government has shot down that proposal
which in any case was a climb down from the Chief of Defence Staff recommended
earlier by a Group of Ministers in 2001. HQ Integrated Defence Staff created
for enhancing jointness and integration does not have adequate powers or
wherewithal to enforce it. Even NAM 2.0 report has recommended many relevant
structural changes in the Ministry of Defence to improve civil-military
relations but there seems to be lack of political will to implement such
recommendations; the shibboleths of past that military might somehow establish
ascendancy over the civil or political set up fail to go away.
There
is a strong sense of déjà vu that is palpable in the current political approach
to defence and security policies which leaves India vulnerable to China’s
rising military capabilities and its assertive policies across the Line of
Actual Control. While China has been single mindedly pursuing its long term
objectives in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh sectors, Indian response to China’s
strategy remains confused and subdued. Further, Pakistan would be too happy to
join China in any adventure against India. While diplomatic approach would be
of some help, the government needs to take an urgent action to mitigate the gap
in military capabilities along the Indo-Tibetan borders that is becoming wider
with the passage of time.
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