Higher defence management has continued to remain the focus of the
politico-military establishment for last several years without much progress
having been made in the key areas of defence reforms that have been underway
since the Kargil conflict. A 14-member Naresh Chandra Task
Force (NCTF) had reviewed the gaps in defence reforms and submitted a report to
the government in August 2012.
In early April 2013, the National Security
Council chaired by the Prime Minister discussed the recommendations by the NCTF
on National Security. However, some of the contentious proposals were referred
to yet another body for further scrutiny. The government instructed the
Strategic Policy Group (SPG), chaired by National Security Advisor (NSA)
Shivshankar Menon and Cabinet Secretary, to examine the contentious proposals,
including those connected to the defence ministry and armed forces. They were
expected to take a view on a host of proposals ranging from a permanent
Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), cross- posting of Service
officers to MOD, and the creation of Advanced Projects Agency (APA) to
undertake futuristic military R&D and review of the practice of
blacklisting armament companies.
The Ministry of Defence while reviewing the NCTF’s recommendations
has stuck to its old narrative and has not been in favour of even creating a
permanent Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee which is a much diluted version of
the Chief of Defence Staff recommended by the Group of Ministers’ Report of 2001 which was again based on inputs provided by Kargil Review
Committee.
The MOD, true to its bureaucratic traditions has not approved of
many of the other recommendations like cross-posting of officers and some other
suggestions of the Task Force on defence reforms. Jaswant Singh, a former
Defence Minister in his book ‘Defending India’(Bangalore: Macmillan India, 1999,p.109) had remarked that "-the
Defence Ministry, in effect becomes the principal destroyer of the cutting edge
of the military's morale; ironic considering that very reverse of it is their
responsibility. The sword arm of the State gets blunted by the state
itself." In July 2013, the MOD in its recommendations
to the National Security Council Secretariat cited several reasons for its
negative views on NCTF proposals.
MOD Rejects ‘Permanent Chairman of COSC’ Proposal
The 2001 GOM Report’s main recommendations
regarding management of defence included creation of Chief of Defence Staff
(CDS) with a designated defence staff with a view to establish synergy and
promote jointness among the armed forces. It is also true that the concept of
CDS however does not evoke an unequivocal and positive response from the three
Services. The apprehension from smaller Services being that their interests may
be disregarded and perhaps the status of single Services Chiefs lowered.
Though, these apprehensions need to be allayed by a providing careful balance
on vesting centralised responsibility and power to CDS, the absence of CDS on
the other hand leaves the field open to the civil servant to become the
'decider' instead of a uniformed person for inter-Service issues.
Recommendation for CDS based on GOM Report 2001 could not
be realized because the government threw in a googly in the shape of obtaining
political consensus from respective political parties; little or no efforts
were made to obtain consensus. A letter to the political parties was written
and that was the end of it.
While negating the NCTF proposal for a permanent Chairman of COSC,
the MOD in its recommendations to the NSCS has given the reasons in June this
year as lack of consensus amongst the three services on the issue. According to
the MOD submissions to the NSCS, only the Navy supports the proposal for permanent
Chairman COSC, the Army is against the proposal and the Air Force’s concurrence
is conditional. Further, the MOD says that the present system of the three
Service chiefs and the collegiate COSC briefing the Defence Minister has been
functioning well.
And to ward off further criticism of MOD’s attitude, the stock
reply given is that in any case the Government has as yet not decided on the
issue since the NCTF proposals would be considered by the Cabinet Committee on
Security. It appears that the government would continue to stall the issue in
keeping with its erstwhile policy on the matter. Apparently, there was also
some pressure on the members of the NCTF to not to give such a recommendation.
However, wisdom prevailed and the proposal was included in the report.
However, turf battles between services have been part and parcel of
even the militaries of advanced nations like the U.S. before their services
were forced to move towards integration and jointness through legislative
measures. The U.S. forces were brought together under one umbrella through
Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986. When the need for creating
the institution of CDS/Permanent Chairman COSC has been felt and approved by
expert groups consisting of strategists, politicians and bureaucrats and endorsed
many times by Parliament’s Standing Committee on Defence, it is only political
will that would be instrumental in fructification of this vital reform.
Not only this, a simple measure like cross-posting of officers
between the MOD and Service HQs to bridge the civil-military disconnect has
also been rejected for some flimsy reasons. Cross-posting of officers would
have generated synergies in functioning of the MOD and without this the
integration would remain ‘cosmetic’ even while the MOD claims that the present
system has been functioning well. Many reports of the Parliament’s Standing
Committee on Defence have been urging the MOD to implement this recommendation
of the GOM Report and the same has been endorsed by the NCTF but the
bureaucrats have been adamant on not executing an already approved
recommendation.
Unless there is a CDS with some degree of authority vested in him
to promote interoperability, jointness and integration, the armed forces would
not be able to efficiently pursue their missions in the wars of knowledge age.
CDS is also necessary for commanding eventually the Integrated Theatre Commands
which are inescapable for adopting a unified approach in envisaged theatre of
military operations. Differences in the respective services on their approaches
to a single point military advisor for the government have also enabled the
bureaucrats to stymie the unification and integration of the defence services.
Further, in our despondency on the government’s approach to the institution of
CDS, we should not accept the half-baked idea of the permanent Chairman, COSC.
Defence Planning
HQ IDS has prepared Technology Perspective Capability Roadmap 2013 which is somewhat of a modified version of TPCR-2010. This document identifies the military technologies needed
by the armed forces in consonance with its 15 Years Long
Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP). This is an unclassified document that
provides information to the defence industry (both private and public sector
undertakings) as to what kind of capabilities armed forces would be looking for
in the next 15 years period. According to the Defence
Minister Mr. AK Antony, the objective is “to establish a level playing field
for the Indian defence industry, both public sector and private sector.”
Regular interaction between the defence industry and the MOD would help in
developing ‘contemporary and future technologies as well productionising
equipment required by the armed forces’.
As is well known, a major modernisation programme of the armed
forces is under way and it is expected that a capital budget of 150
billion US dollars is expected to be spent over the next decade or so. The
question remains whether our Defence Procurement Procedures are up to the mark
despite many upgrades. And what can our indigenous defence industry offer us?
Firstly, the problem of perspective plans remaining an amalgam of
the individual service plans has not been overcome as yet. This is mainly
because there is no CDS or permanent Chairman, COS with the necessary mandate
(i.e. budgetary control) to ensure that Five Year Defence Plans (FYPD) and
consequently 15 years LTIPP are in fact not integrated.
Secondly, it is rare that FYPD and LTIPP are approved by the
government in time. While the Defence Acquisition Council headed by the Defence
Minister approved the 12th FYDP (2012-2017) in
April 2012, the same continues to await approval by the
Ministry of Finance and CCS. The LTIPP (2012-2027) was
also approved in principle by the MOD but continues to await the government’s
nod. The approval of the two vital documents by the MOD is of no consequence
unless the same are approved by the government. Thus, even after introduction
of the defence reforms in 2001, the defence planning
process continues to suffer from inadequacies which can be surmounted if there
is a political will.
Problems of defence preparedness are further compounded by the
defence acquisition woes. While the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) has
undergone a series of modifications and iterations, the evidence on the ground
does not indicate that the acquisition process has acquired any momentum. The
latest version is of 2013 vintage which is said to be
based on experience gained on DPP of 2002, 2003,
2005, 2006, 2008,
2009 and 2011. The saga of
acquisition of 126 Medium Multi-role Combat Aircraft still
continues without any aircraft being inducted so far; the defence budget is
also facing cuts again in the financial year 2013-2014 due
to the economic downtrend. Similarly, though a deal for import of 145 Ultra-Light 155mm was concluded with
the U.S. through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route some years ago, it has
not fructified. Meanwhile, not only the U.S. has revised its prices for the
guns, the Rupee has also depreciated against the dollar thus further
compounding our budgetary problems. But then these are recurring problems which
our politico-bureaucratic decision-makers have been unable to address.
Another factor which needs to be paid attention is the fast rate of
obsolescence of technology which has made the operational life cycle of
equipment shorter. The technology upgradations would be required in 10 years or so compared with much longer period in the earlier years.
It is also being said that India has already missed two technology cycles and
in the bargain two acquisition cycles. And therefore, the critical gaps in our
armed forces’ capabilities are widening which needs urgent attention.
Thus, the much required institution of CDS that was diluted by the
NCTF to the concept of permanent Chairman COSC has also not found acceptability
with our MOD mandarins. But then as mentioned earlier, there is no point in
accepting any watered down version of the CDS. The Parliamentary Standing
Committee on Defence which had been a strong votary of the concept of CDS has
omitted to take any views on the subject in the last few reports submitted to
the government. Given the trend and views of politico-bureaucratic class it
would be no surprise if the Naresh Chandra Task Force proposal is finally
rejected by the CCS. The adhocism in our defence planning process and its
concomitant adverse impact on the modernization programme of the Armed Forces
continues. This has been so despite the cautions given by the previous and
current Army chiefs as also by the Air Force and Naval Chiefs. The critical
hollowness and gaps in our capabilities are widening tempting our known
adversaries to take advantage of our vulnerabilities. The Parliamentary
Standing Committee on Defence has been pointing out to the various ills
connected with our defence planning and procurement processes and mechanisms
without the same being addressed meaningfully by the government.
There are many useful recommendations made by the NCTF but they are
likely to meet the same fate as earlier reports. Further, optimal utilization
of resources cannot be achieved unless greater emphasis and attention is given
to the process of budget formulation and implementation including forecasting,
monitoring and control of defence planning processes. While Technology
Capability Perspective Roadmap 2013 has been made yet
there are many imponderables attached with it. Our politico-bureaucratic and
military leadership needs to move fast in ushering in the recommended defence
reforms to meet the security challenges from our assertive adversaries.
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