As Hassan Rouhani takes
office and comes face to face with Iran’s myriad domestic and foreign
challenges, the recent crisis in Syria has put him in a state of quandary. On
one hand, hardliners in Iran have openly criticised the US’ decision to carry
out an outright attack on Syria post the use of chemical weapons. On the other
hand, in an effort to reduce sanctions against Iran and create trust, Rouhani
is expected to demonstrate a softer side to his interlocutors, particularly the
US.
While strongly condemning
the use of chemical weapons, Rouhani is being careful not to explicitly tie
Iran to the Assad regime. The key question is to what extent can Rouhani go so
as to maintain or not damage his moderate and reformist image in the West and
elsewhere?
Tackling the ‘Hard-Line’
Iran's ruling mullahs,
Syria's main ally in the region, view the survival of the Assad regime as
important to their aims. Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is a stalwart
supporter of the Assad regime, which he sees as the frontline resistance
against the Israel-US combine. Similarly, the powerful Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC) have an even stronger interest in supporting Assad and
ignoring his alleged use of chemical weapons. A chorus of Revolutionary Guard
commanders have issued dire daily warnings that US strikes on Syria would
result in a conflict engulfing the whole region - implying retaliation against
Israel, presumably by Iran's Lebanese ally, Hezbollah. They are poised to
return Iran to the same old posture of defiance if the president's message of
moderation falls on deaf ears abroad.
However, there is general
fear among the hardliners and the moderates in Iran that retaliation against
the US will leave Iran with additional sanctions. Also, it will add to already
bitter relations not only with Israel but also the Arab states allied with the
US such as Saudi Arabia, UAE and Jordan.
Rouhani’s centrist approach
of constructing a middle ground to cater to country’s economic, political and
security problems will benefit Iran in the short-run. Therefore, this suggests
that the Iranian political establishment, including Khamenei and the Guards,
will give Rouhani enough elbowroom on the same stage as US and its accomplices.
Living up to Expectations
It is all very well and good
for Rouhani to describe himself as a moderate and to speak about greater
engagement with the West, but for such words to be believable, they must be
supported with specific actions. He understands that if Iran gets itself involved
against US intervention, then he will be inviting severe criticism.
In order to qualify as an
‘appeaser’ to the West as well as the hardliners in Iran, Rouhani has played it
safe so far. First, by varying his views from the hardliners - he agreed upon
the use of chemical weapons as ‘impermissible’, and at the same time, opposed
intervention in Syria.
Second, he is keen on
developing a ‘logical relationship’ with the West on nuclear issues, given the
depths of mutual mistrust between the two countries, in a manner that caters to
some extent to the expectations of both the US and Iran’s domestic
constituents. In the past, he has openly declared that improved relations with
the US allowed Iran to complete its nuclear infrastructure even while negotiating
Third, Rouhani's success
will depend on how he rescues Iran's ailing economy; he understands that Iran’s
economic stability is impracticable without sanctions relief. If he allows
Syria to spoil Iran’s nuclear negotiations, his presidency will falter just
months after it began.
Will Rouhani Walk the Talk?
Given the critical state of
the Iranian economy, the polarised civil and political society of Iran, and the
eagerness of a large number of Iranian natives for change, if Rouhani fails to
show political courage and the will to deliver his campaign promises, he will
again fall in the category of ‘powerless presidents’ unequipped to make
progress. In this context, two points deserve attention.
First, Rouhani perhaps does
not restrict the utilisation of chemical weapons out of a feeling of religious
or ethical commitment – his first concern may be the investments made by the
Islamic Republic, and the suffering of the Syrian people may be considered
collateral damage. Second, Rouhani desires a controlled conflict in Syria; a
trigger perhaps to show Iran as an important regional player. But his strategy
of ‘reason and moderation’ could easily succumb to regional and domestic
demands of going anti-US, and for this to not happen he will have to strike the
right balance between domestic politics and Iran’s international relations,
particularly with the US.
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