On 05 November 2013,
Pakistan’s Strategic Forces Command once again tested the 60-km
range Hatf-9 (Nasr) short-range ballistic missile (SRBM).
Salvoes of four missiles were fired from multi-tube launchers. According to the
ISPR, the nuclear-tipped Nasr missile has in-flight manoeuvre capability. The
missile was first tested in April 2011 and then again in
May 2012 and in February 2013. It is
reported to be a replica of the Chinese M-20 missile.
Dr Shireen Mazari, Chief Executive Officer, Strategic Technology
Resources, has said that the Nasr missile is a technology demonstrator and has
not yet been inducted into the nuclear arsenal. "We are signalling our
acquisition of tactical missile capability and miniaturisation technology. This
will allow our already developed cruise missiles - the Hatf-VIII (Ra'ad), which
is an air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) and Hatf-VII (Babur), which is a
ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) - to be miniaturised for sea-launched
submarine capability in order to move on to a second-strike capability."
Tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) like the Nasr are inherently
destabilising and there are several compelling reasons for leaving these out of
the nuclear arsenal. Firstly, these are extremely complex weapons (particularly
sub-kiloton mini-nukes, because of the precision required in engineering) and
are difficult and expensive to manufacture and support technically. Inducting
them into service even in small numbers would considerably raise the budget of
the strategic forces.
Secondly, the command and control of TNWs needs to be decentralised
at some point during war to enable their timely employment. Extremely tight
control would make their possession redundant and degrade their deterrence
value. Decentralised control would run the risk of their premature and even unauthorised
use – Kissinger’s ‘mad major syndrome’. Thirdly, since the launchers must move
frequently to avoid being targeted, dispersed storage and frequent
transportation of TNWs under field conditions increases the risk of accidents.
Lastly, the employment of conventional artillery and air-to-ground precision
weapons by the enemy may damage or destroy stored nuclear warheads.
It was for many good reasons that the US and its NATO allies and
the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact forces developed, produced, stockpiled in
large numbers and planned to use tactical nuclear weapons as weapons of war.
Even the mini-nukes and the so-called ‘clean’ enhanced radiation neutron bombs
would have, if used in substantial numbers in a European war, afflicted a few
hundred million civilians, including future generations, with long-term
radiation sickness of incalculable magnitude.
The professed military utility of blunting a major armoured
offensive is debatable as the attacker would ensure that he does not present a
concentrated target before the bulk of tactical nuclear weapons, or at least
their delivery systems, have been destroyed in an initial phase that itself
would turn out to be apocalyptic. Even then, the attacker would concentrate
rapidly for short durations only at the point of decision and then disperse
quickly. In the well-developed, semi-urban terrain of Punjab on both the sides
of the Indo-Pak boundary, collateral damage would be unavoidable. Hundreds of
thousands of civilian casualties would be politically unacceptable and
unmanageable for an army fighting a war.
Political and diplomatic reasons also militate against the use of
tactical nuclear weapons. A nuclear posture with a first use option – NATO’s in
Europe and Pakistan’s current nuclear policy – is both repugnant and dangerous.
It is also destabilising and naturally escalatory in nature. With the ongoing
mega media revolution, public opinion is bound to undermine the credibility of
the use of tactical nuclear weapons, and as deterrence is more than anything
else a mind game, the lack of credibility does nothing for enhancing
deterrence. Rather it creates new dangers.
The command and control of tactical nuclear weapons has naturally
to be decentralised during war to enable their timely employment. Extremely
tight control would make their possession redundant and degrade their
deterrence value by several orders of magnitude. Decentralised control would
run the risk of their premature and even unauthorised use based on the
discretion of field commanders, however discerning and conscientious they may
be.
Dispersed storage and frequent transportation under field
conditions, since the launchers must move from hide to hide to avoid being
easily targeted by the enemy, increases the risk of accidents as well as
complicate nuclear security. The employment of conventional artillery and
air-to-ground precision weapons by the enemy may damage or destroy forward
stored nuclear warheads and, though the probability is low, may even set off a
nuclear explosion. Also, widely dispersed nuclear warheads are difficult to
guard effectively and may fall into Jihadi hands – a fear that cannot be taken
lightly in the epicentre of Islamist fundamentalist terrorism.
Even though Pakistan has chosen to acquire these dangerous weapons,
India has wisely opted not to go down the TNW route.The Nasr missile is said to
be Pakistan’s answer to India’s Cold Start doctrine.The Pakistan army proposes
to use the Nasr missile to drop a low-yield nuclear warhead on Indian
mechanised forces that have entered Pakistani territory with a view to stopping
the Indian offensive in its tracks. It is a patently flawed approach as, in
response to a nuclear attack on its forces, India will execute its nuclear
doctrine of massive retaliation and Pakistan will cease toexist as a functional
nation state. Surely, that is not the end state that the Pakistan army is
prepared to accept.
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