Many
in India believe that we have failed in our policy towards our neighbours. For
them the hall mark of any successful foreign policy is good relations with
neighbours. Because we are so big, many think that we must make an extra effort
to win the trust of our neighbours, deal with them generously, without seeking
reciprocity, and show greater sensitivity to their concerns, however misplaced.
They should be given a stake in our growing economy through unilateral
concessions, with any shorter term loss being traded for longer term gains that
economic dependence brings.
Such
thinking overlooks the objectives of third countries in our neighbourhood who
get more space by playing upon the insecurities of small countries living under
the shadow of a behemoth. It also ignores the political thinking, perceptions
of national interest, personal preferences and even prejudices of ruling elites
in our neigbourhood that too determine the quality of their relationship with
India.
Relationships
India
cannot unilaterally mould ties with neighbours who may, in fact, not want to be
embraced too tightly and may want to court other powers both to balance India
and extract more concessions from us.
They
may believe that because of our internal problems, our high tolerance levels,
lack of an internal consensus on treatment of neighbours, existence of
sympathetic local lobbies and sensitivity to accusations of hegemony, they have
scope to disregard our interests and concerns with some impunity.
Critics
should ask themselves whether other big countries surrounded by smaller
neighbours, whether China, Russia or the US, have smooth, conflict free
relations with them. It is not axiomatic for smaller countries to be always
right and the bigger to be always wrong in any conflict of interest.
All
this is pertinent to the controversy generated by our ‘mis-step’ to cut
subsidies on cooking gas and kerosene in the midst of parliamentary elections
in Bhutan, putting the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) in the eye of the
media storm.
Actually,
the best managed relationship with any of our neigbours is with Bhutan, in
which the extremely sensible policies of the Bhutanese monarchy towards India
is a key factor. Unlike Pakistan, Nepal, Bangaldesh, Sri Lanka and lately
Maldives, the monarchy has not played the Chinese card against us. Bhutan is
also monetising its water assets for mutual benefit, which Nepal has failed to
do with India.
Criticism
of the government for wanting to put foreign policy constraints on Bhutan and
pursuing the British imperial tradition of treating it as a “protectorate” is
misplaced. India has in fact promoted Bhutan’s international personality; it
has revised in 2007 the 1949 treaty that required Bhutanese foreign policy to
be guided by India. Bhutan is often voting differently from India as in the
case of the Arms Trade Treaty, Iran, Syria and North Korea, without Indian
objections.
Buffer
India
has more reason to create buffers to protect its sovereign territory from the
Chinese threat than the British had to protect their colonial fiefdom. Bhutan
adjoins Arunachal Pradesh which China claims. Any Chinese penetration into
Bhutan outflanks us politically. The Chumbi valley’s strategic sensitivity for
our defences requires that India and Bhutan cooperate with each other to
prevent a deeper Chinese encroachment southwards. The Chinese are keen to have
a diplomatic presence in Thimphu. So far the monarchy, in rejecting the
establishment of any P-5 embassy in Thimphu, has been sensitive to India’s
security interests.
Outgoing
Premier Thinley injected an element of suspicion about Bhutanese dealings with
China by meeting his Chinese counterpart in Rio last year, with China tweaking
us by announcing that diplomatic ties were discussed, a fact suppressed by the
Bhutanese government. Given Bhutan’s delicate position, it must calculate
carefully the pluses and minuses of its overtures to China that make India
nervous.
Our
media commentary on the subsidy issue has been disproportionately critical of
the government, overlooking the generous record of India’s assistance to
Bhutan. In the 10th Plan period- July 2008 to June 2013- we have provided Rs
6055 crores of assistance, which included Rs 1500 crores for Refunds and
Subsidies, of which the kerosene and the LPG subsidy (jumping up from Rs 33
crores in 2011 to Rs 52 crores in 2012 ) is a minor part.
Assistance
Some
concerns about transparency in the utilization of Indian assistance to Bhutan
have persisted, with calls within MEA for corrective action, which is not
abnormal. Following MEA’s request to the Ministry of Petroleum to examine ways
to make the supply of all POL products to Bhutan commercially viable, the
Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) apparently conveyed to Bhutan, without further
consultations with the MEA, that prices would be increased from July 1, causing
wide speculation in the Bhutanese media whether this was a political move.
To
suggest that the MEA suddenly lost its diplomatic sense by initiating this move
amidst Bhutanese elections would be unjustified. In reality, after the February
visit of Premier Thinley, the MEA released a further standby credit of Rs 400
crores to tide over Bhutan’s rupee crunch and in May the last tranche of the
Excise Duty Refunds of Rs 300 crores was released, which refutes any intention
to apply a politically calculated squeeze. MEA’s already announced in-principle
decision to restore the LPG and kerosene subsidy next month closes the
unfortunate episode.
Despite
an unpleasant hiccup, all’s well that ends well. The PDP, which campaigned on
developing stronger ties with India has won, even as the losing DPT has
emphasized the importance of maintaining good relations with us. The monarchy,
which has always given paramount importance to ties with India, should welcome
the election results as it is unlikely that the PDP will gratuitously create
during its tenure undercurrents of suspicion in India-Bhutan ties.
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