In
evaluating the argument that for global nuclear disarmament to be possible,
norms that delegitimise and devalue nuclear weapons are needed, we first need
to understand norms and their difference from injunctions (legal or moral), and
the emergence of norms. Norms may be defined as, a principle of right action
binding upon the members of a group and serving to guide, control, or regulate
proper and acceptable behaviour. Norms comprise both of behaviour, observable
recurrent patterns, as well as beliefs and expectations. Social norms can
emerge through human design as well as an unintended outcome of uncoordinated
human action. The crucial element sustaining the norm is the presence of
conditional preferences for conformity. Only the joint presence of a conditional
preference for conformity, and the belief that other people will conform to a
particular ideal, will produce an agreement between normative beliefs and
behaviour.
That
the establishment of norms devaluing and delegitimising nuclear weapons could
go a long way in paving the path towards global nuclear disarmament has often
been argued. There are various reasons to not expect the linear progression as
imagined in the hypothesis.
The
first, and the strongest argument available, pertains to the prestige and
utility value of nuclear weapons and how they provide weaker powers security
against bigger and stronger powers. The norm of non-use of nuclear weapons that
developed after its use in Hiroshima and Nagasaki is a taboo that precludes the
possession of nuclear weapons. In fact, the normative taboo with regard to use
of nuclear weapons notwithstanding, there are more states who have rushed to
possess nuclear weapons than the ones who have given up. Nuclear weapons remain
an insurance for states seeking parity with superior powers (Pakistan-India;
India-China; China-United States) and for states seeking security against
regime change (North Korea).
When
the utility value of possessing nuclear weapons for the above set of states is
examined, it seems that the normative considerations have not been and would
not be enough to stop them in their pursuit. States such as Brazil, South
Africa or Argentina, that have given up the nuclear weapons option have been
states whose security calculus had no value of the possession of nuclear
weapons. However, the states whose security imperatives called for the utility
of nuclear weapons, have gone ahead (Israel, India, Pakistan) and the others
(North Korea, Iran) have assiduously moved towards the goal, despite the threat
of the US. As long as the utility of the possession of nuclear weapons remains,
normative conditions will be difficult to satisfy. This, by far, would be the
strongest argument against the development of norms against nuclear weapons and
its success in terms of moving towards global disarmament.
The
example of the taboo against chemical weapons, which is used as the successful
precedent for suggesting a similar course of action for nuclear weapons, may
have its own problems. As to how the norm against chemical weapons came to be
accepted is a matter of a rich debate with insights from varied perspectives.
Even if we assume that we can decipher the trajectory by which the taboo
against chemical weapons emerged and replicate them, it would be a matter of
conjecture as to how successful the efforts would be. It is important to
remember that it took almost a century for the taboo against chemical weapons
to be an accepted norm; and almost half of this century was also the period of
the discovery of atomic power and the threat of nuclear annihilation. Yet, the
taboo concerning nuclear weapons was a taboo against its use and not directed
at its utility and possession.
The
search for a normative understanding for doing away with nuclear weapons also
takes away attention from the current issues of concern. It is like an
intellectual black hole in which all measures concerning nuclear issues can be
lost. While global nuclear disarmament has not been achieved, the range of arms
control measures and treaty agreements have fulfilled a function, even if
through unequal perpetuation of the nuclear divide, and can perhaps serve as
building blocks for the emergence of norms. Efforts towards global nuclear
disarmament cannot wait for norms, but such measures should continue at their
pace and needs, and the consensus on issues. These, in turn, could pave the way
for the emergence of norms delegitimising and devaluing nuclear weapons.
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