The
May 25th extremist attack by Maoists in Chhattisgarh was one of the depredations
that hit India. But, more tragic is what follows – delayed tactical response,
leadership confusion and helplessness, scripted statements carrying no
conviction and even ministers looking for opportunities to derive political
mileage. In the world of security what happens is important, but what decides
the end game is how the governments respond to them. While the former is not
always and fully in their control, the latter is a matter of their conscious
choice. The tragedy of what they fail to protect and prevent is compounded by
the wrong or inadequate response that guarantees perpetual failures.
There
is a predictable pattern of discourse that follows major attacks. Political
statements and counter statements, Centre versus State blame game, accusations
of intelligence and security failure, all relevant, but leading nowhere. There
is no clear and unequivocal message to the perpetrators, enunciation of a new
national policy and strategy, initiatives towards capacity building and
pressing into action innovative tactical plans.
Prevention
of this obfuscated discourse necessitates clarity on the fundamentals. Left
wing extremists are enemies of the nation – their ideology, political goals,
trans-national linkages, strategic plans all make it amply clear. Their history
of siding with the Chinese during the 1962 war, supporting Pakistan Army’s
genocide in East Pakistan and dubbing Indian intervention as imperialist,
aligning with Kashmiri separatists and supporting North-East insurgents leave
no doubt about their intentions. Their putting in place an 18,000 plus
guerrilla force, nearly 16,000 sophisticated arms, weapon procuring and
manufacturing infrastructure, fund raising abilities and an effective
propaganda apparatus clearly indicate their burgeoning capacities. Misled by
the rhetoric of them being social activists or crusaders for the poor, we
should not underestimate their intentions and capabilities. There is no room to
treat them anything other than being enemies of the state who have to be fought,
vanquished and neutralised.
The
second point that obfuscates the discourse is its political dimension. The
message that goes out to the Naxalites is that the government is confused and
weak, dishonest and insincere, lacks the gumption to take the battle to its
logical end, and wilts under the pressure of media, local level political
workers, extremist linked NGOs, etc. The political cross-fire between the
Centre and the States only gladdens their hearts. There is a need to make the
message to the extremists loud and clear that the state will use all its power
to protect its sovereign rights. In the instant case, the Congress leaders were
wrong in trying to give it a political colour and advance possible conspiracy
theories. There is no ambiguity whatsoever about the role and responsibility of
the Centre and the States. Article 355 of the Constitution unequivocally
affirms that “It shall be the duty of the Union to protect every State against
external aggression and internal disturbance”. Left Wing Extremism (LWE) is no
more a “public order” issue, and falls well within the innermost circle of what
Justice Hidayatullah calls “three concentric circles” of threats. In the
judgement in Ram Manohar Lohia vs. State of Bihar (1965), the Supreme Court
asserted that when a threat transcends limits of public order and threatens
internal security, the overriding responsibility lies with the Union
government. However, to make it happen, the Prime Minister needs to be strong
to have his writ run both at the Centre and in the States.
The
next requirement is strong laws with an efficient criminal administration
system to administer them. The threats, internal or external, that threaten the
unity, integrity and sovereignty of India, require a different jurisprudence
than ordinary criminal laws and must empower the state to deter and neutralise
the enemies. The front organisations, masquerading as NGOs and think tanks, who
skilfully assist the extremists in exploiting discontent and subvert them to
take recourse to the gun must be made accountable. Those who provide them
intellectual and ideological space by projecting them as social revolutionaries
are as guilty as the gullible people who take to arms. It is also necessary
that the justice system functions with speed, fairness, transparency and
honesty. To bring down the crisis of legitimacy, any illegal police action or
efforts to frame the innocents should be dealt with an iron hand.
The
state police forces, due to their superior knowledge of terrain, language and
customs of the local people. are best suited for counter-LWE operations. There
is an urgent need to increase their strength, provide them better leadership,
training, weapons and equipment. It is pertinent to note that Naxalism has
assumed deep roots in States where the number of policemen available per one
lakh population is amongst the lowest and much below the national average of
135. This situation should be corrected immediately and minimum of 200
policemen per lakh population must be made available to the Naxal affected
states. Not just quantity, but quality equally matters. What India requires is,
as the Padmanabhaiah Committee advocated, a “highly motivated,
professionally-skilled, infrastructurally self-sufficient and sophisticatedly
trained police force.”
The availability
of real-time actionable intelligence is critical for launching surgical
operations against the Naxal leadership and guerilla armies. For this the
operational capabilities of state intelligence, right up to the police station
levels must be bolstered for undertaking tactical operations. A good
intelligence often has made the difference between victory and defeat, and life
and death. We have to develop a totally different set of capabilities to cater
to our rapidly changing intelligence requirements. This needs to be done at
several levels—from our training modules to doctrines to equipment. This
transformation has to be across the spectrum of our intelligence capabilities
and operations. Concerted efforts to choke Maoists’ sources of finance and channels
of procuring weapons also deserve high priority.
The
war is difficult but winnable. The need is for capacity building both at the
Central and State levels and right leadership to convert plans into realities
on the ground. They have started the war; it will be finished by us.
Ajit
Doval, KC (Director, VIF)
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