The elections are over in
Pakistan, and the political scenario in terms of the next government is clear.
Nawaz Sharif is the new Prime Minister, and he has adequate support in the
Parliament and is not heading an unstable coalition. The Prime Minister of the
other big neighbour - China, with whom there was a tension along the borders
during the last two months, also visited New Delhi few days earlier.
For India, China and Pakistan
are extremely important neighbours. No doubt, every neighbour in the region is
important for India, however, China and Pakistan are special neighbours. Both
countries are not only nuclear weapon powers, with whom India has fought wars
and has unresolved border disputes, but also important from a domestic
perspective. No other countries in the region is so much debated within India;
equally important, the Indian polity and multiple ministries are not so deeply
divided with other countries, as they are vis-a-vis China and Pakistan.
The Chinese Prime Minister
came to New Delhi, fully prepared to face the questions on what happened in
Ladakh in terms of the Chinese troops intruding deep into the Indian territory.
Though he deliberately underplayed the incident, he did not attempt to scuttle
the issue. More importantly, he did not try to be jingoistic over the issue. It
appears, he was well briefed for the questions, and certainly came well
prepared. Not only on the border question, but he came well prepared and
briefed on the question of water sharing between the two countries.
It clearly appears, China is
more keen to expand the economic ties with India, and down play the border
conflict. It also appears the Indian polity is also equally divided in terms of
what should be the primary focus during the Chinese Prime Minister visit. While
a section within India, especially led by the Defence ministry and Home
ministry, along with most of the strategic community in India expected the
Prime Minster to act tough on the border question. Clearly, there is a
pro-China group within the strategic community, which wants India to underplay
the border tension and expand the economic ties with China. In fact, the Prime
Minister himself seems to be in this section, trying to focus more on the
economic ties.
Interaction with China should
not be either - or strategy in terms of whether India should work with China,
or pursue a conflicting relationship. As the political status, economy and
strategic interests grow, both India and China are likely to compete with each
other in many spheres. But, this competition need not necessarily be a
conflicting one. On the other hand, given India’s growing relationship with the
US, and expanding interests in the Asia-Pacific, both countries are likely to
pursue a conflicting path.
The global strategic
interests of China and India, and their regional aspirations in the
Asia-Pacific is likely to impact on India-China border conflict, and also
increase tension in the China-Pakistan-India triangle. While India cannot
afford to be totally pacifist and avoid any strong response, especially on its
vital interests within in its border, or elsewhere, India cannot also afford to
be jingoistic. India’s response has to be strong, but not war mongering.
Vis-a-vis Pakistan, it is
also time that New Delhi decides what it wants to do with Pakistan, in terms of
bilateral relationship. However, the unfortunate truth is “New Delhi” is not
monolithic in terms of what it wants to do. The Prime Minister’s Office,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Home Affairs are
deeply divided over a policy towards Pakistan. While the policymakers in these
ministries try to hide behind “public opinion” or “lack of consensus” in the
Parliament, the hard truth is our political elite in Delhi is deeply divided
over how we see Pakistan, and what we want to develop, in terms of a long term
relationship.
Undoubtedly, Pakistan is not
a monolith. There is a huge divide between the political parties and the
military; irrespective of whichever party comes to power, led by the PML-N or
the PPP, the general belief is – the real power lies with the military. There
is enough statistical evidence to prove such a belief that in terms of
Pakistan’s India policy, the real power lies with the military and not the
elected Prime Minister.
So what should India do
vis-a-vis Nawaz Sharif? Should India attempt to pursue a cautious policy and do
nothing vis-a-vis building a long term relationship with Nawaz Sharif? Or,
should India go beyond the question over “trust” and the ability of a Pakistani
Prime Minister to deliver on India-Pakistan relationship.
On this question, there is a
need to relook India’s expectation towards Pakistan, and in particular the new
Prime Minister. He will not “deliver” Kashmir to India; nor he will eliminate
the Laskar-e-Toiba completely from Pakistan. Nor he will become a “super” Prime
Minister of Pakistan and bring its powerful military under his total control.
He will not even be able to exert a reasonable pressure on the ISI, forget the
rest of military. He may neither give a complete go ahead to India to do what
it wants in Afghanistan.
If the above a reasonable
assumption of what Nawaz Sharif is unlikely to deliver, should India keep away
from him and not engage Pakistan? While there will always be a trust factor in
how India sees Pakistan and its elected leadership, the same will also be true
vis-a-vis how Pakistani Prime Minister sees India. In a sense, his situation is
worse than the Indian Prime Minister, for he has to constantly look over his
shoulder to find out what the opposition, especially the religious political
parties, military and the militants are likely to do vis-a-vis his India
policy.
So, what should be a strategy
vis-a-vis the new Prime Minister in Pakistan? While jumping readily into a
peace process is also a sign of weakness, refusing to engage a country because
of what had happened in the past, is also equally a sign of weakness.
Irrespective of whether Sharif will be able to “deliver” on the above
questions, India will have to engage Nawaz Sharif, especially on Kashmir, and
other CBMs covering a wide spectrum.
J&K may be a good place
to start this process, especially over cross-LoC CBMs. India should move ahead
and expand the CBMs, make the cross-LoC trade fruitful and a “Kashmiri” CBM.
Even if India has to make certain unilateral gestures on cross-LoC trade, New
Delhi should move ahead. Indian economy is too strong and New Delhi should not
be petty. India should also propose larger cross-LoC CBMs, especially in the
movement of people and move beyond just divided families. These are small
measures, but have a huge impact not only along the LoC, but also across the
international border.
While talking peace always
may be a sign of weakness, shying away from it will also become a weakness, and
only strengthen the hardliners.
D Suba Chandran
Director, IPCS
E-mail: subachandran@ipcs.org
Director, IPCS
E-mail: subachandran@ipcs.org
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