Pakistan’s quest to acquire
tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) has added a dangerous dimension to the already
precarious strategic equation in South Asia. The security discourse in the
subcontinent revolves around the perennial apprehension of a conventional or
sub-conventional conflict triggering a chain reaction, eventually paving the
way for a potential nuclear crisis haunting peace and stability in the region.
The Pakistan army’s
directorate of Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), announced the successful
testing of the 60-km nuclear-capable short-range missile Hatf IX (Nasr) on 11
February 2013 and declared, “…Nasr, can carry nuclear warheads of appropriate
yield, with high accuracy… and has been specially designed to defeat all known
anti-tactical missile defence systems.” The test, an implicit signal to the
region about Pakistan’s commitment to developing “full spectrum deterrence
including the use of TNWs”, was witnessed by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff Committee, General Khalid Shameem Wynne, Director General Strategic Plans
Division, Lieutenant General Khalid Ahmed Kidwai (Retd), and Commander Army
Strategic Forces Command, Lieutenant General Tariq Nadeem Gilani.
While Pakistan believes that
the Nasr “adds deterrence value to Pakistan’s strategic weapons development
programme at shorter ranges,” it has, in fact, further lowered its nuclear
threshold through the likely use of TNWs. Pakistan has not formally declared a
nuclear doctrine, but it is well known that nuclear weapons are its first line
of defence. Its presumed “first-use” policy is aimed at negating India’s
conventional military superiority by projecting a low nuclear threshold. The
use of TNWs in the India-Pakistan case will alter the strategic scenario
completely as Pakistan would threaten India with the use of TNWs in the event
of New Delhi responding against Islamabad with a conventional strike in
reaction to a 26/11-style terrorist attack. According to the Pakistan army,
TNWs are designed to counter India’s Cold Start doctrine. Under this new
policy, Indian troop formations could well face an onslaught of Pakistani TNWs.
Tactical nuclear weapons,
often referred to as “battlefield”, “sub-strategic”, or “non-strategic” nuclear
weapons, usually have a plutonium core and are typically distinct from
strategic nuclear weapons. Therefore, they warrant a separate consideration in the
realm of nuclear security. The yield of such weapons is generally lower than
that of strategic nuclear weapons and may range from the relatively low 0.1
kiloton to a few kilotons. As Pakistan is already building its fourth nuclear
reactor at Khushab—a plutonium producing unit, the clamour in the Pakistan
armed forces for manufacturing tactical nuclear weapons has gone up.
Pakistan has been advocating
the concept of a Strategic Restraint Regime based upon the principle of nuclear
restraint and conventional force reductions and has termed it as a strategic
confidence-building measure. Often citing what it terms as “India’s
conventional military threat”, Pakistan forgets that given its offensive
strategic posture and continuing involvement in terror strikes in India, it is
New Delhi which is confronted with the problem of developing a strategy to
counter Pakistan’s “first-strike” and proxy war in light of its declared
“no-first-use” policy.
India has always viewed
nuclear weapons as a political instrument whose sole purpose is to deter the
use and threat of use of nuclear weapons against itself. India’s nuclear
doctrine clearly outlines the strategy of credible minimum deterrence and also
establishes that India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike.
However, India shall respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail.
To achieve this end, India’s nuclear doctrine calls for a sufficient,
survivable and operationally prepared nuclear force; a robust command and
control system; effective intelligence and early warning capabilities;
comprehensive planning and training for operations in line with strategy; and
requisite primary and alternate chains of command to employ nuclear weapons.
If Pakistan intends to
develop these lower-yield nuclear warheads that can be fired from short-range
tactical missiles, a future limited war scenario with India with grave
repercussions remains a possibility. Pakistan should cooperate with India by
taking requisite steps to stabilise nuclear deterrence and minimise existential
nuclear dangers. It should not indulge in further destabilising nuclear
deterrence in the name of “balancing the asymmetry with India in conventional
capabilities.” India, yet again, has acted as a responsible player by not going
down the TNW route fully acknowledging the perils involved. Pakistan needs to
introspect. Even one nuclear strike-- tactical or otherwise --whether in India
or against Indian forces, shall unquestionably invite massive punitive
retaliation that will finish Pakistan as a nation state.
The history of nuclear
deterrence tells us that TNWs lower the nuclear threshold and that makes them
inherently destabilising. Their command and control is complex as it involves
delegation of the authority to launch to commanders in the field if they are to
avoid being confronted with the “use them, or lose them” challenge. Pakistan
has opted to go down a dangerous path. It must stop its quest for TNWs as
weapons of war.
- See more at:
http://www.vifindia.org/article/2013/march/29/pakistan-s-dangerous-quest-for-tactical-nukes#sthash.YawtlH6t.dpuf
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