Rise of China: Challenge or Opportunity?
China’s
extraordinarily rapid rise in the hierarchy of global power is raising concerns
about its future policies. Opinion is divided whether China will increasingly
assert its power in disruptive ways or will act more responsibly as its own
stakes in the international system grow. Arguments can be made for both views,
though emerging signs suggest that China’s self-assertion is becoming an
unpleasant reality, whereas the expectation that it will work for and within a
global consensus remains more a matter of hope.
A
rising China presents both a threat and an opportunity. The dilemma for India,
the US, Japan, the major European countries and others is how to find a balance
between engaging China to build on the positives and constraining it to ward
off the negatives.
China’s
economic and commercial expansion is making it a crucial country in global trade
and financial flows. The opportunities provided by the huge and growing Chinese
market cannot be ignored by governments and corporations. At the same time, with
recession and unemployment in the western countries, concerns about China’s
mercantilist approach, its IPR violations and resort to unfair competition are growing.
The accumulation of huge foreign exchange reserves by China has led to demands
by the West of financial re-balancing, revaluation of the Chinese currency and
a shift in China’s export led strategy towards stimulation of domestic demand.
At the same time, with the Eurozone in crisis China is being wooed to invest in
European securities to alleviate the sovereign debt crisis there.
China’s
growing military strength is a natural fall-out of its phenomenal economic growth
in the last thirty years. The weight of the PLA in decision making in the country
is causing muscle-flexing by China sooner than expected. The political fiction
of China’s peaceful rise is being exposed by its aggressive maritime claims in the
South China Sea as well as stepped up claims on Indian Territory, causing great
anxiety in its neighbourhood.
Sino-Indian Relations: a Brief Overview
India,
with geographical contiguity with China since its occupation of Tibet in 1950, is
directly affected by the various dimensions of China’s rise. Its dilemmas are somewhat
sharper than those of others because of this contiguity and the nature of the
issues involved in the relationship.
India’s
China problem began with its failure to properly assess the security implications
of the take over of Tibet in 1950 by Maoist China. For the first time in history
a political and geographical buffer between China and India was being removed.
In the absence of a formally demarcated border in the western sector in Jammu
and Kashmir and China’s position on the McMahon line in the east, its occupation
of Tibet should have warned us of the dangers ahead.
Within
12 years of its entry into Tibet China imposed a border conflict on India, whereas
without territorial contiguity the two countries had no conflict between them for
thousands of years. In fact, they interacted culturally very productively over centuries
through the spread of Buddhism in China. The Indian and Chinese civilizations
even marked the wider space between them without conflict or rivalry-the
culture of South-East Asia-and even gave this region the name of Indo-China.
The
1962 border conflict came as a political shock to India as India had bent over backwards
ever since its own independence and the Maoist revolution in China to reach out
to the communist regime and accommodate it bilaterally and regionally, whether
by immediately recognizing it, supporting its rightful entry into the United Nations,
recognizing Tibet as an autonomous region of China or holding China’s hands at
Bandung and helping to alleviate the fears of the South-East Asian countries of
the communist take-over of this large country.
India
made a crucial mistake in signing the 1954 Trade Agreement with the Tibet region
of China that accepted, in effect, China’s sovereignty over Tibet, without linking
this vital concession to either a settlement of the boundary with Tibet or at least
an agreement on the framework of a settlement. India should have anticipated that
sooner or later China would extend its physical control upto the geographical frontiers
of Tibet as it perceived them or as they suited its strategic needs.
China’s
unilateral action in altering the ground situation by constructing the Aksai Chin
road in Ladakh prompted India to hedge against further encroachments and fait accomplish
by extending its presence and authority in remote areas hitherto left unoccupied.
Its strategy failed with the Chinese decision to “teach India a lesson” in the
1962 border conflict which scarred India politically, militarily and psychologically.
The
border issue is at the core of India’s mistrust of China and the uncertainty
about its future intentions. That two large rising countries should have an
unsettled 3000 kilometers plus long border between them is a recipe for instability,
tensions and even conflict. China is deliberately keeping the border issue
unresolved so that it can continue to serve as a pressure point on India. It
has kept changing its position on possible solutions, entailing India into
interminable discussions of principles and guidelines that it interprets as
suits its interests.
Any
realistic solution to the border issue has to be based on the ground realities.
As the long border is not permanently manned, each side has its own view of the
border areas it actually controls and this generates periodic tensions. The
understanding reached between the two sides some years ago to exchange maps of
their respective perceptions of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in order to
identify the physical extent of the disputed areas was suddenly terminated by
the Chinese side without explanation. During Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit to
China in 2003, India proposed a “political solution” to the issue, to which end
Special Representatives(SRs) of the two countries were nominated and given a
mandate to establish a set of guidelines (which they have done) for proceeding
towards resolution. The SRs have met 15 times without any real breakthrough. On
the contrary the Chinese have exploited the opening given to them to demand
transfer of inhabited Indian territory-the Tawang tract-not actually under its
control to China for “political” reasons. China has in effect hollowed out the
purpose of setting up the SR mechanism by expanding its agenda beyond the
border dispute to the “strategic” relationship between the two countries.
Meanwhile, in efforts to stabilize the relationship, the two sides have agreed
to a hot line between the two leaders and a new mechanism at the Foreign Office
level to contain any escalation of incidents at the border. India and China
have also agreed to maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean area with piracy
in mind.
In
1962 China withdrew from Tawang and the rest of Arunachal Pradesh largely to what
is the McMahon line, thereby de facto accepting its validity. In the western sector,
it did not go back to the pre-1962 line and retained the fruits of its
aggression. If it needed to hold Tawang for religious or security reasons or
felt that its legal claim was rock solid, it would not have withdrawn. 50 years
later to demand the cession of Tawang exposes China’s chicanery. China can, if
it wants, solve the border issue on the same basis as it has done with Myanmar,
Russia as well as with Central Asian countries, with very nominal territorial
adjustments.
The
extent of Chinese cynicism is reflected in its specious claim on Tawang because
of its Tibetan links and the fact that one of the earlier Dalai Lamas, an
institution that it has tried to destroy politically, was born there. Its
pretense that it raises the Tawang issue in deference to Tibetan sentiments
flies in the face of Dalai Lama’s public position, that Tawang belongs to India
as well as the 2008 Tibetan revolt against China’s rule. The current incidents
of self-immolation by Tibetan monks in the larger Tibetan region testify to the
deep alienation of the Tibetan people with Chinese rule.Instead of seriously
negotiating with the Dalai Lama to resolve the festering issue of denial of political
and cultural rights of a distinctive people and the suppression of their
separate identity, the Chinese are using Tibet as the platform to make
territorial demands on India.
Unfortunately,
India is unwilling to politically back the Dalai Lama out of concern for the
repercussions of such a policy on India-China relations. There is no international
pressure either on China to negotiate with the Dalai Lama. China can revile him
as a “splittist”, even when he has publicly reaffirmed on various occasions his
acceptance of Chinese sovereignty and has limited his demand only to real autonomy.
An honourable deal between China and the Dalai Lama is good for China, Tibet
and India-China relations.
With
China’s unwillingness to settle the border issue and our incapacity to force
the issue, India has tried to stabilize the situation on the border as much as
possible through the Agreements on Maintaining Peace and Tranquility and on
Confidence Building Measures in the 90’s. These have contained but also frozen
the border problem to India’s disadvantage. The status quo favours the side not
anxious for change. India wants peace on the border but also wants a border
settlement. It suits China also to have peace as it defuses the border issue
politically and militarily for the period China needs to consolidate its rise
while giving it a free hand to settle Tibet internally.
If
China raises territorial issues with India provocatively, it is because China
has the confidence of a stronger hand. Militarily, China has advantage on the
border because of the easier terrain on its side and vastly better
infrastructure that now includes a railway line to Lhasa for easier and quicker
movement of troops and war material. In the western sector it holds a line
beyond its own claims. In the eastern sector it withdrew voluntarily in 1962 to
its present position and now claims more territory as part of “meaningful”
territorial adjustments. It plays the Tibet card against us without any
complex, as all its claims on us are on Tibet’s behalf. It is undeterred by the
fact that its own position in Tibet is contested by the Dalai Lama and the
Tibetan people.
Unlike
Pakistan’s position vis a vis us, India has not made the resolution of the border
dispute a pre-condition for normalizing bilateral ties with China. This gives China
reduced incentive to reach a settlement. While we may see our approach as mature,
constructive and contributing to peace, the Chinese could easily view it as yielding
and conciliatory. China thus profits from our diffidence believing that time is
on its side. Its posture on the border keeps us off-balance politically and
militarily, while imposing economic costs on us, all of which retards our
nation building effort.
Periodic
reports of China making incursions into our territory raise jitters in India, recalling
the trauma of 1962. To defuse the political fall-out, the government defensively
claims that the incidents are confined to areas where the two sides have differing
perceptions about the LAC. The rational approach of delineating the respective
perceptions on the map, identifying the pockets of overlapping claims and then
proceeding to find a solution have been rejected by the Chinese. The
“political” approach proposed by India in 2003 has perversely allowed China to
increase its appetite by claiming territory not under its control, with the
result that the Special Representatives are not able to move forward. During
his visit to India in December 2010, ostensibly to defuse mounting tensions,
Premier Wen delivered the hard message that it may not be possible to ever
resolve the boundary issue fully.
Rather
than work to create a favourable political atmosphere for resolving boundary differences,
China has poisoned it by asserting its claim over the whole of Arunachal Pradesh
as a matter of principle and on Tawang in particular. The airing of this claim on
the eve of President Hu Jintao’s visit to India in 2006 showed China’s scant
regard for ground realities as well as Indian political sensitivities. China
has upped the ante by broadening its bilateral differences over Arunachal
Pradesh by raising them in a multilateral forum like the Asian Development Bank
by objecting to the Bank financing a small irrigation project there.
India’s
belated decision in the face of provocative Chinese territorial claims to improve
the infrastructure in the border regions, activate air fields, position
advanced aircraft as well as augment ground forces, have aroused reactions from
Chinese analysts and newspapers. Even though it is claimed that opinion in
China is no longer monolithic, such articles cannot appear in defiance of party
or governmental thinking. Some condescending commentaries have appeared in the
Chinese press warning of a repetition of 1962 if India continues to provoke
China by asserting its sovereignty over Arunachal Pradesh. Even the break-up of
India into several states has been advocated. Such writings have not appeared
in the China’s state controlled press for years and some observers do not rule
out China fomenting some border trouble, if only to deflect attention from
mounting internal problems. If India has increased its military capacity along
the border compared to the past, it is essentially defensive in character and
calculated to avoid a repetition of 1962.
The
water issue between India and China looms as a major point of contention in the
future given China’s plans to build dams on the Brahmaputra in Tibet and divert
its waters to the water deficit northern part of the country in what will be a
colossal engineering feat. China’s forays into the Indian Ocean, its efforts to
establish port facilities in key strategic points there which later can be
upgraded to naval facilities, its plans to obtain access to the sea through
Myanmar and Pakistan in order to partially resolve its “Malacca dilemma”, are
all issues with a bearing on India’s security.
Pakistan
has been a willing pawn in China’s hands to thwart India’s ambitions and keep
it boxed in South Asia. Without being seen as confronting India directly and generating
an atmosphere of open hostility-which does not suit its strategy of presenting
its rise as peaceful-it lets Pakistan do this. By making Pakistan nuclear and
giving it weapon delivery capability, China has neutralized India strategically
within South Asia itself. Pakistan has been given the means to continue its
politics of confronting India without India being able to retaliate militarily
even though it enjoys conventional military superiority.
By
building up a countervailing military power in India’s neighbourhood, China has
used Pakistan to prevent India from exerting its leadership role even within
South Asia. China opposed the India-US nuclear deal on the ground that it was discriminatory
towards Pakistan. The depth of its strategic commitment to Pakistan is demonstrated
by the fact that contrary to its NSG obligations it has announced the decision
to build two additional nuclear power plants in Pakistan. It wants to give Pakistan
the benefit of international civilian nuclear cooperation without going through
the NSG process and without imposition of non-proliferation conditions on it,
even though that country has become the hot-bed of terrorism, Islamic extremism
and clandestine nuclear proliferation. It is widely suspected that civilian
nuclear cooperation with Pakistan is a convenient cover to continue assisting
it in its strategic programmes.
With
energy security and the unrest in Sinkiang in view, China has begun to look at this
territory illegally occupied by Pakistan with even greater strategic interest
than before. Uighur separatists can be kept under a watchful eye from there,
while through Gwadar oil and gas from the Gulf can be transported to bordering
Sinkiang. China can link up its interests in Afghanistan too through this
contiguous area. China would therefore want Pakistan’s hold over this region
consolidated economically and legally.
While
massive infrastructure projects help achieve the former goal, questioning and contesting
India’s legal status in J&K serves the latter objective as it puts India on
the defensive and erodes its locus standii in challenging Pakistan’s illegal
possession of POK and GB. With its new stakes in mind, China aims to become an
inescapable factor in any India-Pakistan final settlement of the Kashmir issue,
with the objective, in such an eventuality, of denying India any future role in
Pakistani held territory.
Moreover,
by entrenching itself in this region firmly, China would want to be able to protect
its strategic investment in it, should the Pakistani state slide increasingly towards
failure. China will not make such large investments in POK if it did not intend
to eventually protect them diplomatically and, if required, militarily. China protests
if international institutions fund even minor development projects in Arunachal
Pradesh on the ground that it is “disputed” territory, but does not apply its own
logic to the development projects of magnitude that it is funding in POK.
With
its increased political, economic and military weight, China is stepping up its
presence in countries around India. In Afghanistan China intends investing
heavily in the mineral sector and a railway link. It is likely to accept an
opening to the Taliban as an insurance for the stakes it is developing in
Afghanistan within the framework of its strategic relations with Pakistan.
China
has used a judicious mix of propaganda about Indian hegemony, the natural sense
of insecurity of small countries under the shadow of a large one, religious and
ethnic differences as well as economic and military assistance to add to
pressures on India from within the region. In Nepal it is becoming more
assertive in demanding equal treatment with India in terms of our respective
treaties with that country. With the Maoists now a powerful political force in
Nepal, and given their ideological compulsion to be seen as drawing Nepal closer
to China, coupled with their periodic statements calculated to inflame public
opinion against India, the political terrain has become more favourable for
China. This can only make India’s task in handling Nepal more difficult.
China’s
position in Bangladesh is entrenched. Even Sheikh Hasina’s friendly government
would see it in its interest to maintain close ties with a rising China and the
benefits that can bring, including giving India an incentive to woo Bangladesh more.
China has earned the gratitude of the Sri Lankan government by supplying it arms
that helped in defeating the LTTE. Sri Lanka, along with Myanmar, Bangladesh and
Maldives, are targets for China’s naval ambitions in the Indian Ocean area to protect
its vital lines of communication through these waters. The so-called “string of
pearls” strategy, with commercial goals in view in the short term and military
goals in the longer term, includes construction of new port facilities in
select countries. To promote these objectives China is bound to step up further
its engagement with these countries, especially with increasing material means
at its disposal, posing further challenges to India’s interests in its
neighbourhood.
China’s
penetration of Myanmar, its expanded presence in Iran and economic domination
of Central Asian countries, all present a regional scenario for India that would
limit India’s future margin of manoeuvre, politically and economically.
Analysing India’s Engagement of China
China’s
policies and conduct tax the Indian government’s effort to temper domestic reaction
and maintain a friendly posture towards its northern neighbour. There is some
disconnect between the government’s positive, and even exonerating, discourse on
China and the general public sentiment towards that country. The government may
be right at one level to pursue an accommodating approach as India cannot afford
to have tense borders with both China and Pakistan. If China needs peaceful borders
for pursuing its development goals, India needs them even more. We have two
inimical neighbours who are collaborating to contain India strategically. Tensions
with at least one of them have to be reduced to the extent possible so that the
military, political and economic burden on India is lightened. The government
has allowed economic contacts to develop with China to the point that the
country has become our largest trading partner in goods. China has exploited
this Indian compulsion by pursuing a policy of containing India under cover of
engagement, of touting a strategic partnership while gravely undermining us
strategically, of inducing us to accept politically that it does not pose a
threat to us and yet threatening our territorial integrity as well as our vital
interests in our neighbourhood. If India’s soft policies on China continue,
China can conveniently treat India as a tactical piece in its larger design of
deflecting concerns about its frenetic rise as a formidable power.
The
settlement of the border issue would open doors wide for an across the board cooperation
between the two countries, but China obviously does not see the need for combining
our respective strengths to alter the global landscape to our advantage. China
wants to keep India under pressure, give itself space to brow beat it when required
and put it in a position where it has to appeal to Chinese goodwill for securing
its international ambitions as was the case when India sought China’s support
in the NSG for international civilian nuclear cooperation and for its bid for permanent
membership of the UN Security Council. China wants to slow down as much as
possible India’s rise to regional and global status.
Many
arguments can be made in favour not only normalisation of relations between India
and China, but a strong entente between the two. Imagine the two most populous
countries in the world, with two-fifths of humanity between them, growing energetically
at close to double digit figures, integrating themselves rapidly with the global
economy, with increasing claims on the world’s resources to fuel their future growth,
having a community of interest in tackling the problems at the forefront of international
concern, -environment, climate change, terrorism, religious extremism, pandemics,
UN functioning etc -working in tandem on the global stage. This would shift the
global balance of power decisively towards Asia. But Sino-Indian differences
have greater debilitating effect on India as compared to China as the gap in
our respective national power has widened. China can offer economically more and
it can intimidate more. It has a certain vision of its own preeminence and the romantic
notion of two Asian giants working together to change the global landscape appeals
little to the authoritarians in Beijing.
China’s
handling of its differences with India makes sense from the Chinese point of view.
It has the upper hand on the border and its military infrastructure there is
far superior. It already possesses large swathes of Indian territory. The
economic gap between the two countries, already huge, is growing. China’s
economic integration with the world is far deeper than India’s, giving others
much greater stake in it as compared to us. It has successfully contained India
by bolstering Pakistan against us with nuclear weapon and missile technology
transfers. It has insidiously used other neighbours to prevent India from
consolidating its leadership in South Asia. If it settles the border issue with
India, it will release India from a two-front bind, supposedly expose Pakistan
to increased Indian pressure at a time when it has become more vulnerable, lose
leverage with other neighbours of India who will move into the Indian orbit
more decisively and free India to pursue its regional and global ambitions more
confidently. This would inevitably be at the cost of China’s preeminence in
Asia and at the global level. China may think it has more to gain than lose by
a policy of thwarting India even as it engages it.
India
too is engaging China but lacks the resolve to look for options for containing it.
We cannot seek to contain China alone. We can of course build up our military strength,
especially our strategic capability against China. This in time will help to “contain”
Chinese ambitions. But we need to immediately join hands with others who too
fear China’s rise and the resurgence of nationalism in the country.
China
reacted strongly to the attempt some years ago to build a quadrilateral arrangement
between Asian democracies-India, Japan, Australia-along with the US, with
Singapore thrown in. Australia retreated quickly, followed by Japan. President Obama
has begun to talk of a better geo-political balance in Asia. India has to play
a sophisticated game of hedging its bets against China in a pragmatic manner.
Apart from strengthening relations with Japan, South Korea and Vietnam, India
has to reinforce its Look East Policy as much as possible. Increased
cooperation with the US Navy in the Indian Ocean would be part of containing
the disruptive consequences of a rising China that is territorially
expansionist and one that is at times accused of having a 19th century balance
of power outlook.
Formulating
a policy towards China that finds the right balance between engagement and
resistance is not easy. We are obliged to engage with China as it is fast on
the road to becoming the world’s number two power. The balance of power in Asia
has already shifted towards it in significant measure in the last couple of
decades. Its inroads into the Gulf area, Africa and Latin America are now
giving it a higher global profile. It has become the world’s biggest exporting
country; it has accumulated huge financial surpluses which it is using to
secure access to raw materials across the globe, those that it needs to fuel
its future needs. Its spectacular economic growth continues even as the
advanced industrial countries are in the throes of a serious economic
depression, tilting global financial power in its favour, especially as US’s financial
health has become unduly dependent on China’s investment of its surpluses in US
securities. It is not surprising that China’s position as a global
manufacturing hub and its export over-drive have had a sizable impact on
neighbouring India too as China has become India’s largest trading partner in
goods.
As
part of its engagement strategy, India holds a regular high level political
dialogue at the bilateral level, including a bilateral strategic dialogue of
sorts. India also engages with China in multilateral groupings such as the
Russia-India-China dialogue and the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa
dialogue. The most recent BRICS summit was held in New Delhi in March this
year. At this summit consensus could be reached by India, China and the other
three countries on greater representation of emerging and developing countries
in global governance, concern was shared about the economic and financial
policies of developed countries spilling over negatively into the emerging
market economies. The slow pace of IMF quota reforms was criticized. The
creation of a new Development bank for infrastructure projects in BRICS and
other developing economies was discussed and an agreement on extending credits
in local currency under the BRICS Interbank Cooperation mechanism was reached.
All these are initial steps to obtain greater say in managing the global
financial system and diluting the supremacy of the dollar, even as it is clear that
progress on this will be slow and the biggest beneficiary will be China. Regrettably,
Chinese reticence explains absence of support from this group for India’s (and
Brazil’s) candidature for permanent UNSC membership. This reflects the as yet
unsettled political equations within the group that will detract from its global
impact.
At
the East Asian Summit and ASEAN linked forums like ARF, India and China are working
together without mutual grating. China has now observer status at SAARC, notwithstanding
our past paranoia about China’s intrusions into our geographical space. Peace
and Tranquility on the border are being maintained despite periodic testing of
our nerves by the Chinese in “disputed” areas along the Line of Control (LAC).
Bilateral Confidence Building Measures now include limited joint military exercises.
The two countries cooperate on Climate Change and WTO negotiations.
China
has become India’s largest trading partner in goods, with bilateral trade reaching
over$70 billion in 2011 and expected to reach $100 billion by 2015. The economic
dimension of the relationship has acquired a new dynamic with the institutionalizing
of a Strategic Economic Dialogue between the two countries-the second round of
which will be held this year-and the setting up of a CEO’s Forum. China has
become a powerful player in two vital sectors of the Indian economy-the power
and telecommunications sectors-despite security concerns. India wants to have a
manageable relationship with China.
India-China trade relations have expanded
phenomenally in recent years, raising hopes that such increase in mutual stakes
may help resolve outstanding political differences. This proposition has to be
persuasively tested because the virtual economic and financial fusion of the US
and Chinese economies has not ended serious political differences betwen the
two, nor has the massive Japan-China economic relationship softened the
undercurrents of Chinese hostility towards Japan.
In
our case, although bilateral trade has reached impressive figures, the
ballooning trade deficit ($20billion) with China imposes a limit on trade
expansion unless the trade becomes more balanced, which would mean China giving
more opportunities to Indian companies in its home market. Pro-China economic
lobbies in India have, however, emerged with an economic giant rising next to
us; there are those in India who advocate an enlightened policy of taking
maximum advantage of this development for sustaining our own growth rates, with
the least amount of restrictions consistent with basic security.
In
many areas of manufacturing, China can now provide world class equipment-in the
power and telecommunication sectors for instance-at much lower prices compared
to western equipment. But there are security concerns about sourcing telecommunication
equipment from China, though the pro-China business lobby in India feels that
such concerns are exaggerated. There is wariness about allowing Chinese
companies to operate in “sensitive” areas, whether those close to our borders or
near military centres and installations. China’s practice of using its
unskilled and semi-skilled labour to undertake projects abroad has run into
problems in India. The mounting trade deficit with China is becoming unsustainable,
more so as China restricts opportunities for our IT and pharmaceutical
companies in its domestic market. China’s dumping practices is another source
of irritation in relations. China’s effort to corner a sizable chunk of the
Indian market through artificially low priced products is threatening
competition and endangering domestic industry. China’s interest in a Free Trade
Agreement with India is not looked at positively by us.
China’s
strategy of integrating its provincial economies with neighbouring regional economies,
and creating the infrastructure to make this possible, presents problems for
us. China can strengthen its market presence in our neighbourhood at our cost, besides
becoming a magnet for our own border regions.
At
the international level it is easier to work out cooperative strategies in
Climate Change or WTO negotiations, for instance, because there is no direct
clash of interests-on the contrary both countries can exert their joint weight
to counter pressures from advanced industrial economies. But such cooperation
in specific areas should not make us lose perspective on the total content of
our relations.
Is China an Adversary?
China,
as things are, is India’s adversary, even if at government level we avoid characterizing
our relations with our powerful neighbour in these terms. On the face of it
India has all the attributes to be in the same league as China, whether it is physical
or demographic size, skills or civilizational depth. But China has outstripped India
as a rising power, and the gap already existing between us will continue to
grow in at least the decade and a half ahead. China is better organized, more
purposeful in formulating policies and implementing them, and much less
constrained by domestic public opinion.
Militarily,
China has developed capacities that we will find difficult to match. China has
rivalry with the US in mind, and the sinews it develops to pursue that will
take care of any developing Indian challenge. No doubt China does not currently
have access to western conventional defence technology because of an arms
embargo imposed by western countries on it after the Tiananmen events. It is
not able to secure from Russia the kind of platforms and weaponry that Russia
readily supplies to us. But it has developed an indigenous defence production
base that is impressive. In ballistic missile and nuclear weapon technologies
China has forged ahead of India decisively.
India has taken a substantial step forward in
acquiring a credible nuclear deterrent capability against China with its
successful Agni V test on April 19. The Indian press played up unnecessarily
the China dimension of this missile, provoking Chinese press reactions to the
effect that China was much ahead of India in missile capability and warning
India not to be arrogant, apart from seeking to incite western opinion against Agni
V by suggesting that India was downplaying the actual inter-continental range of
the missile. The reaction of the Chinese government has been unusually sober, emphasizing
the cooperative nature of the India-China relationship and shared interests.
Agni
V should have in reality caused no surprise to the Chinese as India has been transparent
about its Agni missile programme and the planned range of 5000 kilometers.
India is also developing a sea-based long range missile for its nuclear powered
submarine under development. China, in any case, possesses missiles with even
longer range. Earlier it was India that was vulnerable to Chinese missiles and now
the reverse will be true, creating a better balance in deterrence.
US’s
reaction to Agni V reflects the new quality of India-US bilateral relations. In
the 90s and early 2000s, the US was pressing india to curb its missile
programme because it was seen as destabilizing. The thinking today is entirely
different. While avoiding any specific disapproval of India’s step, the US has
lauded India’s nonproliferation credentials and underlined its no-first use
policy, whch would suggest that India’s missile advance is actually seen as
serving US interests too in creating a better Sino-Indian strategic balance in
the years ahead.
Even
if China has a head start over India, and in terms of “national power” is much more
potent than us, India’s steady economic rise, its human resource, the dynamism of
its corporate sector and the size of its domestic market are elements playing
in our favour. India too has weathered the current global slump well. Indeed,
India and China are seen as two countries that the global economy counts on for
easing the strains of the ongoing economic depression by their continued
growth.
India
is planning to spend huge amounts in the coming years on infrastructure development,
an area in which it has been deficient so far. This will erode the advantage
China has at present with its highly modern infrastructure. As labour costs in
China go up, and other aspects of doing business in China begin to weigh more
in the calculus of foreign investors such as absence of a well defined legal
system, violation of IPRs, lack of sufficient access to China’s domestic market
etc. attention will move increasingly towards India, especially if India begins
to address those physical and procedural deficiencies that discourage the
inflow of foreign investment in large volumes. Countries like Japan, which are
the biggest foreign investors in China, are now looking at India.
China’s
export led growth model is considered unsustainable in the long run. The question
is to what extent China can control the transition to a different model without
serious internal disruptions. China’s mercantilist approach does not endear it to
other competing countries. The West has begun to see China’s rise with mounting
concern. These international sentiments play in India’s favour. As a democratic
country, with ways of doing business the West finds more congenial, and with financial
and managerial experts ensconced in western corporations, banks and financial
institutions who can mediate business and investment between India and these
countries, India’s growth is seen with less trepidation. In certain sectors of
the knowledge economy we have a head start over China and this advantage we
will enjoy for some time. Experts are generally agreed that by about 2025, as
China’s economic growth slows down and ours accelerates, the existing gap
between the two economies will get very substantially reduced. At the same
time, India’s hunger for raw materials, especially energy resources, will pit
it increasingly against Chinese competition in the years ahead. Our political
leadership tries to minimize the prospects for such future rivalry by stating
diplomatically that there is enough space for both India and China to grow
without treading on each others’ toes.
China’s Assertiveness and Changing
Geo-strategic Scenario
In
China a politically closed system works alongside an open economic system. Political
dissent is smothered, but not economic enterprise. China accepts that the West
can help in the modernization of its economy, but must not ask for the modernization
of its politics. Its politics must cling to an outdated ideology, though its
economics can be heartlessly pragmatic. How can this kind of a contradiction endure
in a country that is set to become the number two power in the world? When the
rest of the world cedes so much space to China peacefully, it is not
unreasonable for it to expect a reassuring change in how China governs itself
and how it relates to its external environment.
Given
China’s size, its view of itself in historical terms, its claims on India, on Taiwan,
in the South China Sea, its rancour against Japan etc, its rise has wide regional
and international implications. While a policy of containing China would be imprudent,
yet it cannot be given a free hand in Asia. Other players in the region have to
caution China about political and other costs of seeking domination. Any initiative
to that end serves India’s interests even as its engagement with China
continues. However, engagement does not mean acquiescence to Chinese hegemony
in Asia.
China
is manifestly a revisionist power that, to begin with, wants to change the
status quo in its periphery where it has the capacity to make its power felt
more immediately. It has begun to flex its muscles, most notably, in the South
China Sea, over most of which it now claims sovereignty. It is locked up in
maritime disputes with Japan, Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines over the
Spratly and Paracel Islands. It has upped the political and security ante by unilaterally
declaring the South China Sea as constituting its core national interest. Its
claims are based on its own version of history and legality, which, of course,
is contested by its other maritime neighbours.
In
the South China Sea China has larger strategic goals. It has so far been
bottled up in these waters by the chain of islands ringing it in the
east-Japan, Taiwan and the Phillipines. It cannot be a major naval power if it
remains so confined. The blue water navy that it is developing needs unhindered
access to the Pacific as well as the Indian Ocean, both to protect its vital
trade and energy life-lines as well as to challenge the sway the US Navy enjoys
over these oceans, the Pacific in particular. China has plans to operate a
number of aircraft carriers, the first of which has begun sea-trials. It is
expanding its conventional and nuclear submarine fleet and modernizing its
destroyer and frigate fleet.
China
must be able, initially, to deny the US the level of domination it has so far exercised
in the South China Sea. The assertion of its claims in the South China Sea is a
foretaste of its larger naval ambitions. As its military power grows, the
balance with the US and its allies in the region will change automatically,
making its neighbours more vulnerable to Chinese pressure and emboldening China
to become more demanding. Already the US is concerned about the capability
China is developing to target American aircraft carriers with anti-ship
ballistic misiles, as that will make it more difficult for the US to deploy its
assets close to the Chinese mainland. Consequently, the deterrence balance in
the Straits of Taiwan will change.
Most
recently, India has had a taste of China’s claims in the South China Sea when its
naval ship moving along the Vietnamese coast was warned by radio to stay away from
Chinese waters. More seriously, China has objected to Indian oil exploration projects
in two Vietnamese blocks by calling countries to refrain from oil exploration in
maritime areas offered by Vietnam in the South China Sea on the ground of its “indisputable
sovereignty” there. India has rebuffed these objections by stating that its
cooperation with Vietnam or with any other country is always as per
international laws, norms and conventions. India has also reiterated its
position that it “supports freedom of navigation in South China Sea and hopes
that all parties to the dispute would abide by the 2002 declaration of conduct”
pertaining to it. At the recent East Asia Summit India has joined others in
expressing concern about China’s claims in the South China Sea interfering with
the freedom of navigation. The Indian Prime Minister, in his talks with the
Chinese Premier, has also stood his ground on our right to pursue our
commercial interests jointly with Vietnam in the area of oil exploration. Our
Foreign Minister has again reiterated that South China Sea is not the property
of any one nation and is an international waterway, inviting criticism by the
Chinese spokesman.
China’s
position on India’s cooperation with Vietnam in so-called disputed areas contradicts
flagrantly its policies in that part of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir
under illegal Pakistani occupation, exposing the often unprincipled and bullying
nature of its postures. In J&K China, in an area which has seen actual military
conflict, where a cease-fire is holding even though Pakistani-backed efforts to
infiltrate terrorists in J&K continue, China has already undertaken
strategic projects and is now believed to have signed up for a variety of
infrastructure projects totaling US $10 billion. China has argued that these
projects do not pre-judge the status of the territory which has to be resolved
between India and Pakistan.
During
his visit to India in 2010 President Obama had exhorted India not only to Look
East but also to Engage East, in line with the wishes of Asian countries to see
India playing a more active role in the region. Now the call is for India to
Act East. India is cautiously responsive to US calls because it wants to avoid
the risk of sharpening misunderstandings with China that developing joint
strategies with the US may produce, only to find the US and China reaching
bilateral understandings over India’s head as situations evolve.
The
US relationship with China is far more developed and mutually dependent than the
India-US relationship, though the conflictual elements in the US-China relationship
are much more present than in US relations with India, whether now or in the
future. The US continues to hope that China will evolve and the potential clash
of interests can be avoided. There is a counter-intuitive willingness to accept
that China’s responsible behaviour, the legitimacy to some extent of its
paranoia and the development of its military power to protect its globally
spreading economic interests. American China watchers thus send mixed signals
about the implications of China’s rise.
India
queries the relaxed view the US takes of the China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation.
The US has chosen not to oppose expanded China-Pakistan nuclear trade in
violation of China’s NSG obligations. Some US specialists explain that the US
did not want to throw the gauntlet at China on this issue as it wants China’s cooperation
in dealing with the nuclear challenge from Iran and North Korea. US experts in
fact claim that China and India are responsible nuclear powers unlike Pakistan
and North Korea. This is offensive to Indian ears as India considers China’s transfers
of nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan as the greatest threat to its security,
transfers that the US has deliberately kept below the its radar screen.
The
US wants India to focus on the China threat in East Asia by prodding India to Act
East, whereas for India the more immediate and pressing Chinese threat is in South
Asia. The US, however, remains either silent on this threat or actually
distorts reality by projecting China as a responsible player in South Asia with
which the US could work to promote regional peace and stability. If India had
concluded that the Bush Administration’s endorsement of this position and that
of the Obama Administration earlier in its tenure had been repudiated, it was
mistaken as Admiral Willard, the US CINCPAC Chief has spoken the same language
again, even as he has referred to the reality of China’s developing capacity to
target moving US aircraft carriers upto 2000 miles away with anti-ship
ballistic missiles.
India
and the US are far from developing any shared view on China’s stepped up claims
on Arunachal Pradesh, the expansion of its military infrastructure in Tibet,
its river water diversion plans there, its strategic moves in Myanmar and
Pakistan to gain access to the Indian Ocean, the future of the institution of
the Dalai Lama etc. India’s territorial integroty is under threat from China
and Pakistan combined, but, unlike in the case of China where the US endorses
the principle of China’s territorial integrity, there is no similar expression
of support for the territorial integrity of India.
While
China’s rise is a threat that has to be addressed constructively, it also has
to be considered that China too has its options curtailed because of the export
dependence of its economy. It needs world markets for maintaining its growth
rates as well as internal political stability in view of the social fractures
caused by grossly unequal distribution of wealth between the urban and rural
areas that has accompanied the phenomenal expansion of its economy in the last
decade in particular. To achieve their goal of modernizing the Chinese economy
and achieve middle-income status, the Chinese leaders claim they need a couple
of decades more of peace. During this period, however, while maintaining the
fiction of its peaceful rise or development, China can build up its military
power steadily. With every passing year, the options available to others to
restrain China would become fewer and fait accomplis being established under
their very noses would have to accepted. Western democracies, unlike China’s
closed door political system, have electoral cycles, public expectations and,
most importantly, the bottom-lines of their corporations that make them more disposed
to make concessions to China under the convenient garb of investing in peace
and stability.
Concluding Observations
China
presents the biggest strategic challenge to India in the years ahead. In Asia, India
and China are the biggest countries geographically and demographically. On the
face of it, rivalry and competition between the two seem inevitable. The two countries
are rising at the same time, although China’s rise began more than a decade before
India’s and it has been faster. There is now a considerable gap in the economic
and military strength of the two countries, and this gives China more options
on the international stage and an upper hand for the time being in its dealings
with India.
With
such large economies registering sustained high growth rates, with India growing
at high single digit figures and China enjoying double digit growth, access to resources
has become important, and this importance will increase in the years ahead. China
has moved ahead very fast in tying up international resources while India has lagged
behind. There is no collision yet with China but this could occur as India
steps up its efforts.
Notwithstanding
globalisation and interdependence that call for cooperation rather than confrontation
and a search for win-win situations rather than zero-sum games, rivalry for
power is unavoidable between states. China is particularly problematic on this
score because it is nursing historical grievances and is territorially
expansionist. Lack of democracy in China makes the situation more difficult for
other countries in the region and beyond as the Chinese decision making process
remains opaque and public sentiment about policies pursued by the government is
difficult to assess.
China’s
spectacular economic growth cannot but be accompanied by growing military
strength. China can well argue that its expanding international interests require
it to develop the means to protect these interests by deterring interference by
others, as otherwise it will always remain vulnerable to external pressures.
Under cover of this rational argument China can expand its military strength,
as it is in the course of doing. It has powerful nuclear and missile
capability, with more potent missiles being tested. It seems on course to build
a blue water naval capability for force projection and to be able to protect
its long lines of communication stretching across the Indian Ocean. It has now
ample financial resources for expanding its military budget. Its growing
military power has already begun to cause concern.
As
part of its hedging strategy, India holds regular naval exercises with the US
in the Indian Ocean as a joint effort to protect the sea-lanes of
communication. Combined naval exercises are held with US and Japanese navies
too, the strategic import of which could not be lost on the Chinese. We now
have a strategic dialogue with Japan. India has agreed to an India-US-Japan
trilateral political dialogue. We are stepping up our relationship with
Vietnam.
For
all the reasons outlined earlier our dilemmas in dealing with China are particularly
acute. As modern nations India and China have different conceptions about their
international role. The two countries have marked differences in temperament
and outlook, and these have a bearing on the future. Unlike the Chinese, we are
not a competitive people, we do not think in grandiose terms, we are not power
conscious, we are tolerant of dissent, we are less dominated by the state, and
we are not as regimented and disciplined. Our dilemmas with China, apart from stemming
from power equations, reside also in differences of mentality.
Amb. Kanwal Sibal http://www.vifindia.org
© Vivekananda International Foundation
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