Currency and Capital Name of Each Country in the World

Country	Capital	Currency
Countries with Capital and Currency of Asia
Afghanistan	Kabul	Afghani
Bahrain	Manama	Bahraini Dinar
Bangladesh	Dhaka	Taka
Bhutan	Thimpu	Ngulturm
Brunei	Bandar Seri Begawan	Brunei Dollar
Cambodia	Phnom Panh	Rile
China	Beijing	Yuan
Cyprus	Nicosia	Cyprus Pounnd
India	New Delhi	Indian Rupee
Indonesia	Djakarta	Rupiah
Iran	Tehran	Riyal
Iraq	Baghdad	Iraqi Dinar
Israel	Tel Aviv	Shekel
Japan	Tokyo	Yen
Jordan	Amman	Lordan Dinar
Kazakhstan	Akmola	Tenge
Korea (North)	Pyongyang	Won (KPW)
Korea (South)	Seoul	Won (KRW)
Kuwait	Kuwait City	Kuwait Dinar
Kyrgystan	Bishkek	Som (KGS)
Laos	Vientiane	Kip
Lebanon	Beirut	Lebnanesse Pound
Malaysia	Kuala Lumpu	Malaysian Ringgit
Maldives	Male	Rufiyaa
Mongolia	Ulan-Bator	Tugrik
Myanmar	Yangoon	Kyat
Nepal	Kathamandu	Nepalese Rupee
Oman	Muscat	Omani Rial
Pakistan	Islamabad	Pakistani Rupee
Philippines	Manila	Piso
Qatar	Doha	Qatari Riyal
Saudi Arabia	Riyadh	Riyal (SAR)
Singapore	Singapore	Singapore Dollar
Sri Lanka	Colombo	Sri Lanka Rupee
Syria	Damascus	Syrian Pound
Taiwan	Taipei	New Taiwan Dollar
Tajikistan	Dushambe	Tajik Rouble
Thailand	Bangkok	Baht
Turkemenistan	Ashkabad	Manat (TMM)
Turkey	Ankara	Turkish Lira
United Arab Emirates	Abu Dhabi	Dirham
Uzbekistan	Tashkent	Som (UKS)
Vietnam	Hanoi	Dong
Yemen	Sana	Riya (YER)
Countries with Capital and Currency of Europe
Country	Capital	Currency
Albania	Tirana	Lek
Andorra	Andorra-la-vella	Franc Pesta
Armenia	Yerevan	Dram
Austria	Vienna	Schilling
Belarus	Minsk	Manat
Belgium	Brussels	Belgian Franc
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Sarajevo	Konvertibilna Marka
Bulgaria	Sofia	Dinar
Croatia	Sofia	Lev
Czech	Zagreb	Koruna
Denmark	Copenhagen	Danish Krone
Estonia	Tallinn	Kroon
Finland	Helsinki	Marakka
France	Paris	Franc
Georgia	Tbilisi	Lari
Germany	Berlin	Deutsche Mark
Greece	Athens	Drachma
Hungary	Budapest	Forint
Iceland	Reykavik	Krona
Ireland	Dublin	Euro
Italy	Rome	Euro
Kosovo	Pristina	Euro
Latvia	Riga	Lats
Leichtenstein	Vaduz	Swiss Franc
Lithuania	Vilnius	Litas
Luxemburg	Luxemburg	Luxemburg France
Macedonia	Skopje	Dinar
Malta	Valletta	Maltese Lira
Moldova	Chisinau	Leu
Monaco	Monaco	French Franc
Montenegro	Podgorica	Euro
Netherlands	The Hague	Guilder
Norway	Oslo	Norwegian Krone
Poland	Warsaw	Zloty
Portugal	Lisbon	Escudo
Republic	Prague	Koruna
Romania	Bucharest	Lei
Russia	Moscow	Rouble
San Marino	San Marino	Italian Lira
Slovakia	Bratislava	Slovak Koruna
Slovania	Ljubljana	Tolar
Spain	Madrid	Peseta
Sweden	Stockholm	Krona(SEK)
Switzerland	Berne	Swiss Franc
Ukraine	Kiev	Karbovanets
United Kingdom	London	Pound Sterling
Vatican City State	Vatican City	Italian Lira
Yugoslavia	Belgrade	New Dinar
Countries with Capital and Currency of Africa
Country	Capital	Currency
Algeria	Algiers	Algerian Dinar
Angola	Luanda	Kwanza
Benin	Porto Novo	Franc (CFA)
Bostwana	Gaborone	Pula
Burkina Faso	Ouagadougou	Franc (CFA)
Burundi	Bujumbura	Burundi Franc
Cameroon	Yaoundi	Franc (CFA)
Cape Verde	Prala	Cape Verde Escudo
Central African Republic	Bangul	Franc (CFA)
Chad	N’D’ Jamena	Franc (CFA)
Comoros	Moroni	Comorian Franc
Congo	Brazzaville	Franc (CFA)
Djibouti	Djibouti	Djibouti Franc
Egypt	Cairo	Egyptian Pound
Equatorial Guinea	Malabo	Franc (CFA)
Eritrea	Asmara	Etheopian Birr
Gabon	Libereville	Franc (CFA)
Ghana	Accra	Cedi
Guinea	Conakry	Guinean Franc
Guinea Bissau	Bissau	Peso
Ivory Coast	Yamoussoukro	Franc (CFA)
Kenya	Nairobi	Kenya Shilling
Lesotho	Maseru	Loti
Liberia	Monorovia	Liberian Dollar
Libya	Tripoli	Libyan Dinar
Madagascar	Antananrivo	Malagasy Franc
Malawi	Lilongwe	Kwacha
Mali	Bamako	Franc (CFA)
Mauritania	Nouakchott	Ouguiya
Mauritius	Port Louis	Mauritius Rupee
Morocco	Rabat	Dirham
Mozambique	Maputo	Metical
Namibia	Windhock	Rand
Niger	Niamey	Franc
Nigeria	Lagos	Naira
Rwanda	Kigali	Franc
Senegal	Dakar	Franc
Seychelles	Victoria	Rupee
Sierra Leone	Freetown	Leone
Somalia	Mogadishu	Shilling
South Africa	Cape Town	Rand
Sudan	Khartoum	Pound
Swaziland	Mbabane	Lilangeni
Tanzania	Dar-es-Salaam	Shilling
The Gambia	Banjul	Dalasi
Togo	Lome	Franc
Tunisia	Tunis	Dinar
Uganda	Kampala	Shilling
Zambia	Lusaka	Kwatcha
Zimbabwe	Harare	Zimbabwe Dollar
Countries with Capital and Currency of North America
Country	Capital	Currency
Antigua and Barbuda	St. Johns	Dollar
Bahamas	Nassau	Dollar
Barbados	Bridgetown	Dollar
Belize	Belmopan	Dollar
Canada	Ottawa	Canadian Dollar
Costa Rica	San Jose	Colon
Cuba	Havana	Peso
Dominica	Roseau	Sterling
El Salvador	San Salvador	Colon
Grenada	St. George	Dollar
Guatemala	Guatemala City	Quetzal
Haiti	Port-au-Prince	Gourde
Honduras	Tegucigalpa	Lempira
Jamaica	Kingston	Dollar
Mexico	Mexico City	Peso
Nicaragua	Managua	Cordoba
Panama	Panama City	Balboa
St. Kitts and Nevis	Basseterre	Dollar
Trinidad and Tobago	Port-of-Spain	Dollar
United States of America	Washington D.C.	Dollar
Countries with Capital and Currency of South America
Country	Capital	Currency
Argentina	Buenos Aires	Austral (Pesu)
Bolivia	La Paz	Boliviano
Brazil	Brasilia	Cruzeiro
Chile	Santiago	Peso
Colombia	Bogotá	Peso
Ecuador	Quito	Suere
French Guyana	Koenne	Franc
Guyana	Georgetown	Dollar
Paraguay	Asuncion	Guarani
Peru	Lima	Nuevosol
Surinam	Paramaribo	Guilder
Uruguay	Montevideo	Peso
Venezuela	Caracas	Bolivar
Countries with Capital and Currency of Oceania
Country	Capital	Currency
Australia	Canberra	Australian Dollar
Fiji	Suva	Fiji Dollar
Nauru	Nauru	Dollar
New Zealand	Willington	New Zealand Dollar
Papua New Guinea	Port Moresby	Kina
Solomon Island	Honiara	Dollar
Tonga	Nukualofa	Panga

National Counter-terrorism Centre (NCTC): Issues and Options

Going by the recent claims of Home Minister Sushil Kumar Shinde, NCTC would see the light of the day after next month’s Chief Ministers’ conference. Earlier attempts to set-up an umbrella body on counter-terrorism failed mainly because of opposition from states ruled by non-Congress parties. Their concern was that the idea of unilateral operations by the NCTC would infringe on the states’ powers and hurt the federal structure of the country. But, there was also another hurdle in the form of reservations about placing NCTC within the Intelligence Bureau (IB). These two issues have now been addressed: by taking out “operations part” of the NCTC and also by not locating the NCTC within the IB.

Way back in 2009, the then Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram had outlined his vision for “the broad architecture of a new security system that will serve the country today and in the foreseeable future.” His idea was to institute an umbrella body dedicated to counter terrorism on the lines of the American NCTC with control over intelligence, operations and investigation of all matters pertaining to terrorism. The NCTC’s goals, according to Chidambaram, “will include preventing a terrorist attack, containing a terrorist attack should one take place, and responding to a terrorist attack by inflicting pain upon the perpetrators”. The aim of NCTC, according to the former Home Minister Chidambaram, was to reduce the failures of busting terror modules to zero.

Even a die-hard critic would not question the need for NCTC. Response to threats should depend on their nature. Undoubtedly, India is one of the worst affected countries by terrorism and, in the recent period, it has witnessed more terrorist incidents than any other country in the world. India confronts varied forms of threats that range from militancy in Jammu & Kashmir, insurgency in the northeast of India, Left Wing Extremism in Central India, and jihadi terrorism threatening the hinterland. Then there are other threats, over and above the identified main forms, such as illegal migration, drug-trafficking, smuggling of counterfeit currencies, small arms proliferation, organised crime and cyber warfare. All these determine the nature of terrorism confronted by India. Yet, the country lacks a single overarching body dedicated to counter terrorism. The time limit for constituting the NCTC was initially set as end-2010, but is yet to see the light of the day. Now, the present Home Minister Sushilkumar Shinde has indicated his readiness “to tweak controversial proposals to break the impasse.” Any new counter-terrorism body would be a failure unless it is evolved based on consensus of all states of India.

To avoid duplication, Chidambaram wanted all related agencies involved in counter-terrorism (although they are part of different ministries) like Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), Intelligence Bureau (IB), Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), Aviation Research Centre (ARC), Multi-Agency Centre (MAC), Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), National Investigation Agency (NIA) to report to the proposed NCTC (under the Ministry of Home Affairs) on matters related to terrorism. However, there is an intense resistance to this “submission”. There is a pervasive fear that such an arrangement would lead to over-centralisation of powers in the Home Minister and the Ministry of Home Affairs emerging as “super ministry”.

Although the above apprehension is farfetched, it is the responsibility of the Center to convey in unambiguous terms NCTC’s focus i.e. “terrorism only”. It should be acknowledged that intelligence/investigation/security agencies have a far wider mandate than terrorism. Even on matters terrorism, the methodology of working would be cooperation and coordination and not subordination of one agency to the other. The final objective is to bring about synergy and cohesion in counter-terrorism efforts, by doing away with overlapping, duplications, bottlenecks and unnecessary hurdles. To achieve this objective, it is enough if NCTC functions as an umbrella organisation with representations from intelligence, investigation and security agencies. It should be in a position to integrate all instruments of national power, including diplomatic, economic, social, political, military, intelligence, and law enforcement to ensure unity of effort. It should happen at central, state and local levels. The tentacles of the NCTC should penetrate deep down upto district levels instead of being another top-heavy organisation.

It need not follow any international model – US, UK or European – but that which suits India’s capabilities and threats. It has to be innovative and proactive in its approach rather than defensive and reactive. ‘Prevention’ and ‘protection’ should be the main watch words. For this, the Centre should constantly monitor terror/militant groups, their support network, sponsors, sanctuaries, mode of operation, threat potential, and leadership and make periodic threat assessments for policy makers. In this regard, it can effectively use ‘Crime and Criminal Tracking Network System (CCNTS), National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID), Central Monitoring System (CMS) and Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI). Personnel for NCTC could be pooled from relevant intelligence, investigation and security agencies headed by the senior most experienced officer on rotation basis with simple command structure. In this way, turf wars could be avoided, with the potential and efficacy of the agencies maximised.

- See more at: http://www.vifindia.org/article/2013/april/01/national-counter-terrorism-centre-nctc-issues-and-options#sthash.BqjqFhLk.dpuf

Review: India, Pakistan - Propelling Indus Water ‘Terrorism’ (IWT)

The 67-page report is a well-documented analysis of the emerging challenges pertaining to the Indus Water Basin. Among the several recommendations highlighted in the report, the immediate focus is to prioritise investments and institutionalise regular upkeep of the canal infrastructure. The report laid significant emphasis on developing a digitalised online system of the Indus Basin to foster developing a regional network and intensified hydrological modelling capacities. Further prominence was laid on the need to conduct a joint research study evaluating the cumulative environmental impact of multiple dam constructions on an individual watercourse, and develop the technical know-how on the relationship between dam cascades, river basin hydrology, and climate change. It also impressed on the need to increase the knowledge base on monsoon variability trends to improve outcomes for rainfall-dependent agriculture, along with the use of multi-media tools to raise public awareness of climate change within India and Pakistan. Typifying the treaty itself, it also depends on the inflows of the Indus Water Basin, which in a larger perspective, affects climate change that further affects the river system.

The report blames the lax implementation by India and Pakistan for its ineffectiveness stating that "both the countries are lax in their implementation (of the Indus Water Treaty). However, it fails to garner political laxity vis-à-vis its technical responses, and hinders to offer substantial politico remedies in adhering to the treaty. It also does not provide ground artefacts that should bind both the actors in times of observing strict adherence to the treaty. Alternately, the report should have featured the need for a change in the mind-sets of those who govern the management of the watercourse between both countries. Since the cryosphere (snow and glaciers) of the upper Indus Water Basin is rapidly altering, amounting to a rise in the surface air temperatures by 1.80 degrees celsius over the past five decades, this is doubling the global average temperature of the region.

Understanding the dichotomy of the region, in terms of a change in the geo-strategic structures, urges for an imperative need which was found missing in the report. As warming temperatures and changing solid precipitation patterns are altering the duration, timing, and extent of seasonal snow-covered areas, measures to encapsulate a dialogue of trust between India and Pakistan are the need of the hour. Although the report did signify an institutionalised modest exchange of hydrological data between both countries for future exchanges of water supplies, and, more so, “to mitigate Pakistan’s legitimate sensitivities”, it failed to reduce the trust-deficit between both the countries. It is of critical necessity for contributing to a shift in the timing of peak melt runoff, resulting in low river flows during the dry summer season when the demand for water in the lower riparian basins is at its peak. Additionally, the monitored glaciers depict a 17 percent loss in the Suru basin, 15 percent in Zanskar, 6 percent in Nubra, 16 percent in Spiti, 20 percent in Chandra, and 30 percent in Bhaga.

The report enlists equipping third-party scientific agencies with satellite-based remote-sensing capacities to disseminate non-politicised, reliable, and timely hydrological data documenting glacial melt trends to water policymakers and the general public in both countries for greater transparency. However, it does not envisage capacities for dealing with disclaiming valedictions to third-party responses, marked as a popular trend even before the creation of the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) in 1960. The other missing links that the report could have thrown light upon is the establishing of a trade-off between environmental recommendations vis-à-vis developmental recommendations. More so, the report consistently addresses an effort towards establishing joint partnership and cross-border dialogue in terms of the various policy and research recommendations highlighted under Agriculture, Food Security, Energy, Economic Development, Climate Change, Environmental Pressures, Glaciology, Institutions, Governance, and Diplomacy. However, it offers insignificant insight as the same has been identified in the Indus Water Treaty.

It could have also elaborated on issues related to governance rights, and the perennial influence it fosters over the watercourse. The Pakistani Army has a direct influence on mostly all issues related to Pakistan. It manages the rhetoric around water through proxies and allies, as it has its own vested interest in the resource. It controls a significant portion of the watercourse (i.e., 11.5 m/hec which amounts to 12 percent of its total share). The concept of hydro-connectivity and inter-dependence over the politico-technical discourse of the IWT, and factors connecting the catchment with the delta, are other aspects that are found inadequately dealt with in the report.

साइबर क्राइम (अपराध)

साइबर क्राइम एक बढ़ती वैशिवक समस्या है जिसे कठोर कदम उठाकर रोकना ही होगा। प्रौधोगिकी के आगमन से साइबर क्राइम और महिलाओं पर जुल्म उच्च सीमा पर हैं और इस प्रकार साइबर क्राइम किसी भी व्यकित की सुरक्षा के लिए एक बड़ा खतरा है। हालांकि भारत उन बहुत थोड़े देशों में से एक है जिसने साइबर अपराधों से निपटने के लिए आर्इटी अधिनियम 2000 को अमल में लाया है, लेकिन इस अधिनियम में महिलाओं से सम्बनिधत मुददे अभी भी अछूते ही रहे हैं। इस अधिनियम के तहत कुछ अपराधों जैसे हैकिंग, नेट पर अश्लील सामगि्रयों का प्रकाशन और डेटा के साथ छेड़छाड़ को दण्डनीय अपराध घोषित कर दिया है। लेकिन सामांयतौर पर महिलाओं की सुरक्षा के लिए गंभीर खतरे को इस अधिनियम में पूरी तरह से कवर नहीं किया गया है।

कुछ साइबर क्राइम :

साइबर स्टाकिंग - इसका मतलब इंटरनेट पर किसी व्यक्ति का पीछा करना और उसके बुलेटिन बोर्ड पर संदेश भेजना और उसके चैट रूम में घुस जाना।

ई मेल बॉम्बिंग - किसी व्यक्ति ईमेल पर इतनी ज्यादा मेल भेजना कि उसका अकाउंट की ठप हो जाए।

डाटा डिडलिंग - इस हमले में कंप्यूटर के कच्चे डाटा को प्रोसेस होने से पहले ही बदल दिया जाता है। जैसे ही प्रोसेस पूर्ण होता है डाटा फिर मूल रूप में आ जाता है।

सलामी अटैक - यह खाने से संबंधित नहीं है। इस मामले में गुपचुप तरीके से आर्थिक अपराध को अंजाम दिया जाता है। ये अपराध बैंकों में ज्यादा होता है जैसे कोई क्लर्क यदि ऐसा प्रोग्राम बैंक सर्वर में डाल दे जिससे हर खाते से इतना कम धन कटता है कि वह नजरअंदाज होता रहता है।

लॉजिक बम - यह स्वतंत्र प्रोग्राम होता है। इसमें प्रोग्राम इस तरह से बनाया जाता है कि यह तभी एक्टिवेट हो जब कोई विशेष तारीख या घटना आती है। बाकी समय ये प्रोग्राम सुप्त पड़े रहते हैं।

ट्रोजन हॉर्स - यह एक अनाधिकृत प्रोग्राम है जो अंदर से ऐसे काम करता है जैसे यह अधिकृत प्रोग्राम हो।

साइबर क्राइम से निपटना काफी दिक्कतों भरा काम है। हालांकि सरकार समय के साथ-साथ कानून सुधार भी रही है। नए संशोधन में मोबाइल तथा व्यक्तिगत डिजिटल असिस्टेंस को कम्युनिकेशन का साधन माना गया है, जिससे मोबाइल फोन के जरिये होने वाले अपराधों को भी साइबर क्राइम कहा गया है। मेरा मानना है कि इन अपराधों का रजिस्ट्रेशन करने के लिए विशेष प्रक्रिया विकसित करने की जरूरत है। जहां तक दूसरे देशों में रखे सर्वर से होने वाले अपराधों का मामला है तो इसमें इन देशों के साथ समझौता करने से ही काम चल सकता है।

महिलाओं के विरूद्ध किए जाने वाले साइबर अपराध के प्रकार:

बड़े स्तर पर व्यकितयों एवं समाज के विरूद्ध किए जाने वाले विभिन्न साइबर अपराधों के बीच, ऐसे अपराध जिन्हें विशेषतौर से महिलाओं को लक्षित कर किया जाता हैं में निम्नलिखित शामिल हैं:

I. ई-मेल के माध्यम से उत्पीड़न एक नया विचार है। यह पत्रों के माध्यम से उत्पीड़न करने जैसा ही है। ई-मेल के माध्यम से उत्पीड़न में ब्लैकमेल करना, धमकाना, बदमाशी और धोखा देना शामिल है। ई-उत्पीड़न पत्र उत्पीड़न की ही तरह है, लेकिन तब अक्सर समस्या पैदा करता है जब फर्जी आर्इडी से भेजा जाता है।

II. साइबर स्टालकिंग आधुनिक युग में नेट अपराध के रूप में सबसे अधिक कुख्यात अपराध है। आक्सफोर्ड शब्दकोश में स्टालकिंग को ''छिपकर पीछा करना के रूप में परिभाषित किया गया है। साइबर स्टालकिंग में पीडि़त को मैसेज भेजकर, चैटरूप में प्रवेश कर, ढेर सारे ई-मेल भेजकर परेशान किया जाता है

III. महिला नागरिकों के लिए साइबर अश्लीलता एक अन्य खतरा है। इसमें अश्लील वेबसाइट; अश्लील मैग्जीन को कम्प्युटर (सामग्री को प्रकाशित एवं मुदि्रत करने के लिए) और इंटरनेट (अश्लील पिक्चर्स, फोटो, लेखन आदि को डाउनलोड और भेजने में) का उपयोग कर निर्मित किया जाता है।

IV. ई-मेल स्पूफिंग- एक स्पूफ्ड ई-मेल वह कहलाती है, जोकि अपने मूल को दुष्प्रचारित करे। यह वास्तविक स्रोत से बिल्कुल भिन्न होती है। इस तरह की ई-मेल अक्सर पुरूष अपनी अश्लील फोटों को महिलाओं को भेजते हैं, उनकी सौंदर्यता की प्रशंसा करते हैं, और उनसे डेट पर चलने के लिए कहते हैं, यहां तक कि उनसे उनकी ''सर्विसेज के चार्ज भी पूछते हैं। इसके अतिरिक्त, ई-मेल, एसएमएस और चैट के माध्यम से स्पष्ट संदेश भेजते हैं, जिनमें से अधिकांश में पीडि़त के चेहरे को किसी अश्लील फोटो, अक्सर, नग्न शरीर पर लगा देते हैं।

साइबर अपराध से बचने के सर्वश्रेष्ठ तरीके क्या हैं?

1) ऑनलाइन निजी जानकारी को साझा न करें

2) वेबसाइटस पर निजी प्रोफाइल्स न तैयार करें।

3) लिंग विशिष्टता या उत्तेजक स्क्रीन नाम या ई-मेल पते का उपयोग न करें।

4) ऑनलाइन फ्लर्ट या तर्क-वितर्क न करें।

5) अपना पासवर्ड शेयर न करें।

6) साइबर सम्पर्क के लिए एक विशेष ई-मेल तैयार करें।

7) एक अच्छा एंटी-वायरस प्रोग्राम का इस्तेमाल करें।

8. साइबर टाकर्स को जवाब न दें।

9) अपनी समस्त बातचीत को कम्प्युटर पर सुरक्षित (सेव) करें।

अन्य  महत्वपूर्ण प्रश्न उत्तर

1.साइबर हैकिंग  क्या है

:-साइबर हैकिंग अनधिकृत रूप से किसी के सिस्टम से फिजिकली या ऑनलाइन सूचनाएं चुराना है, किसी कंप्यूटर के ई-मेल, उसकी प्रोग्रामिंग, मशीन कोड, ऑपरेटिंग सिस्टम आदि में बदलाव कर उसे उसके ओरिजनल फॉर्म से अलग कर देना है। इसके माध्यम से हैकर महत्वपूर्ण सूचनाओं को चुरा लेते हैं। हैकिंग यहां तक खतरनाक है कि हैकर इसकी सहायता से आपकी जरूरी सूचनाएं मसलन क्रेडिट कार्ड, बैंक अकाउंट से जुड़ी जानकारियां भी चुरा लेते हैं। आईटी एक्ट के सेक्शन-60 के तहत इसमें दंड का प्रावधान है। इसमें तीन साल तक की कैद हो सकती है।

2.एथिकल हैकिंग क्या होती है?

:-एथिकल हैकर साइबर क्रिमिनल से चार कदम आगे की सोचता है। सरकार भी अपने अधिकारियों को एथिकल हैंकिग के लिहाज से मजबूत कर रही है। आज के दौर में साइबर क्राइम का मुद्दा वैश्विक हो चुका है। ऐसे में एथिकल हैकर, साइबर स्पेस में आपको सुरक्षित रखने में मददगार साबित हो सकता है।

3.सोशल नेटवर्किंग साइट्स में पहचान को हैकिंग से बचा पाना कितना मुश्किल होता है। ऐसे में इन क्राइम से बचने के लिए क्या किया जाना चाहिए?

:-यह काफी खतरनाक होता है। यहां पर कोई रोक-टोक नहीं है। कोई भी किसी की सूचना को एक्सेस कर सकता है। चूंकि इन कंपनियों के सर्वर बाहर होते हैं, ऐसे में भारतीय एजेंसियों के लिए इनको एक्सेस कर पाना आसान नहीं होता। जहां तक इन अपराधों को हल करने की बात है तो इन्हें समय रहते हल करना चाहिए, क्योंकि इनके फुट प्रिंट बहुत जल्दी मिटते हैं।

4.देश में साइबर अपराधों से बचने के लिए कानून कैसे हैं?

:-बड़ी समस्या ये है कि सिक्योरिटी एजेंसी और पुलिस अपराधों को रजिस्टर्ड नहीं करती। साथ ही इसके लिए बना हुआ मैकेनिज्म प्रभावशाली नहीं है। यही नहीं, इस मामले में जमानत मिल जाती है। कोई मुजरिम करोड़ों का ऑनलाइन अपराध करने के बाद भी बच जाता है।

5.अमेरिका और यूरोपियन देश इस तरह के अपराधों से कैसे निपटते हैं? एड एजेंसियों द्वारा ई-मेल हैक कर लिए जाते हैं? उनसे कैसे निपट सकते हैं?

:-वहां पर साइबर कानून सख्त है। साथ ही सुरक्षा एजेंसियों के पास आधुनिक  तकनीक  भी उपलब्ध होती है। प्रमुख बात है कि वहां पर इस तरह के अपराधों से बचने के लिए अपनाए जाने वाले सुरक्षा के उपाय काफी बेहतर होते हैं। अमेरिका में एड एजेंसियों द्वारा आने वाले मेल को स्पैम माना जाता है और इससे निपटने के लिए वहां मजबूत कानून होते हैं। लोगों को शिक्षित किए जाने की आवश्यकता है। ऐसी मेल्स के बारे में उनकी प्रतिक्रिया कैसी हो, इसके बारे में उन्हें जानकारी होनी चाहिए।

Sri Lanka: Tamil Nadu and India’s Foreign Policy

       

In a large country like India, relations with neighbouring countries will have their immediate fallout on contiguous Indian states. Thus, India-Pakistan relations will affect Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Rajasthan, and Gujarat; the India-Nepal equation will have its fallout on Bihar, Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, Sikkim, and West Bengal;  India-China relations will impinge upon Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Himachal There is a huge divide between Chennai and New Delhi on how both see Sri Lanka. What remains the primary problem in India’s approach towards Sri Lanka, and why is there a divide within?

Periphery and the Core: Problems of India’s Foreign Policy Paradigm

Pradesh, Uttarakhand, and Jammu and Kashmir; India-Bangladesh relations will have its fallout on West Bengal, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Assam; India-Bhutan relations will affect West Bengal, Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, and Assam; India-Myanmar relations will have its fallout on Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram; India-Sri Lanka relations will have its consequences on Tamil Nadu; and India-Maldives relations will spill over to the Minicoy islands. We have not yet evolved a political mechanism by which the interests of the contiguous Indian states are safeguarded while formulating and implementing the neighbourhood policy.

In the days of one-party dominance, New Delhi very often followed a neighbourhood policy, which it considered to be in India’s national interest, but which adversely affected the neighbouring Indian states. Two illustrations given below substantiate this point. In October 1964, New Delhi signed the Sirimavo-Shastri Pact, which converted the people of Indian origin in Sri Lanka into merchandise to be divided between the two countries; thousands of them were conferred Indian citizenship and repatriated to India. This inhuman agreement was severely criticised by Rajagopalachari, Krishna Menon, Kamaraj Nadar, Ramamurthy, and Annadurai.  In the same way, New Delhi concluded the maritime boundary agreements with Sri Lanka In 1974 and 1976, which ceded the island of Kachchatheevu to Sri Lanka and bartered away the traditional fishing rights enjoyed by Indian fishermen. These agreements were opposed by the DMK government, but New Delhi went ahead.

The Rise of Regional Parties

With the end of one-party dominance and the formation of coalition governments, regional parties began to play a national role. They began to make their inputs into India’s neighbourhood policy.  Three examples prove this point. When Deve Gowda was Prime Minister and IK Gujral the Minister for External Affairs, India-Bangladesh relations forged ahead. Gujral was sensitive to the feelings in West Bengal and associated the West Bengal Government with the formulation of the India’s Bangladesh policy, especially in the sharing of Ganges waters. Second, the inclusion of the Sethusamudram project in the manifesto of the UPA government was due to the persistent efforts made by the DMK Government headed by Karunanidhi. Third, India’s Sri Lanka policy during the final stages of the Fourth Eelam War had the backing of its DMK ally. New Delhi permitted Karunanidhi to indulge in political gimmicks so that he could pose himself as the champion of the Overseas Tamils, but it should be stated that the DMK did not put any serious obstacles in the way of New Delhi pursuing its Sri Lanka policy.

Current Developments in Tamil Nadu

The tumultuous developments taking place in Tamil Nadu should be analysed within the above-mentioned context. Cutting across party lines, there is sympathy for the Sri Lankan Tamil cause. People are angry and bitter that innocent Tamil civilians were massacred during the last stages of the Fourth Eelam War. They also feel strongly that the Sri Lankan Government has gone back on the assurances about devolution of powers to the provinces. The spontaneous upsurge amongst the student community is a shining example of this righteous indignation.

What vitiates the political scenario is the competitive nature of Tamil Nadu politics and the gimmicks performed by the two Dravidian parties in their desire for one-upmanship. In this competitive outbidding, Karunanidhi is on a weak wicket. He wants to atone for his past misdeeds; he has resurrected the Tamil Eelam Solidarity Organisation (TESO) and has called for Hartal in support of the Tamil cause. Jayalalitha is trying to extract maximum leverage from Karunanidhi’s predicament. From being a sharp critic of the Tigers, today she is championing the cause of Tamil Eelam and is advocating a referendum among Sri Lankan Tamils in the island and the Tamil diaspora. She has injected politics into sports and has given the stamp of approval against the participation of Sri Lankan players in the Indian Premier League. She has suggested that the venue of CHOGM be shifted from Colombo to another country. She wants Mahinda Rajapaksa to be branded a war criminal and be tried in the International Court of Justice. She wants New Delhi to declare Sri Lanka an “unfriendly state” and has demanded the imposition of an economic embargo. All these statements have provided exciting fare to her fanatical followers within the state, as well as in the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora.

But the tragedy is, all the above impractical suggestions will in no way bring about ethnic reconciliation in Sri Lanka. On the contrary, it will lead to the accentuation of ethnic tensions. Worse, India’s relations with Sri Lanka, already subjected to severe strains, will further take a nose dive.

                  

Prof. V. Suryanarayan

Former Director, Centre for South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Madras

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