गुरुवार, 4 अप्रैल 2013

Currency and Capital Name of Each Country in the World

Country
Capital
Currency
Countries with Capital and Currency of Asia
Afghanistan
Kabul
Afghani
Bahrain
Manama
Bahraini Dinar
Bangladesh
Dhaka
Taka
Bhutan
Thimpu
Ngulturm
Brunei
Bandar Seri Begawan
Brunei Dollar
Cambodia
Phnom Panh
Rile
China
Beijing
Yuan
Cyprus
Nicosia
Cyprus Pounnd
India
New Delhi
Indian Rupee
Indonesia
Djakarta
Rupiah
Iran
Tehran
Riyal
Iraq
Baghdad
Iraqi Dinar
Israel
Tel Aviv
Shekel
Japan
Tokyo
Yen
Jordan
Amman
Lordan Dinar
Kazakhstan
Akmola
Tenge
Korea (North)
Pyongyang
Won (KPW)
Korea (South)
Seoul
Won (KRW)
Kuwait
Kuwait City
Kuwait Dinar
Kyrgystan
Bishkek
Som (KGS)
Laos
Vientiane
Kip
Lebanon
Beirut
Lebnanesse Pound
Malaysia
Kuala Lumpu
Malaysian Ringgit
Maldives
Male
Rufiyaa
Mongolia
Ulan-Bator
Tugrik
Myanmar
Yangoon
Kyat
Nepal
Kathamandu
Nepalese Rupee
Oman
Muscat
Omani Rial
Pakistan
Islamabad
Pakistani Rupee
Philippines
Manila
Piso
Qatar
Doha
Qatari Riyal
Saudi Arabia
Riyadh
Riyal (SAR)
Singapore
Singapore
Singapore Dollar
Sri Lanka
Colombo
Sri Lanka Rupee
Syria
Damascus
Syrian Pound
Taiwan
Taipei
New Taiwan Dollar
Tajikistan
Dushambe
Tajik Rouble
Thailand
Bangkok
Baht
Turkemenistan
Ashkabad
Manat (TMM)
Turkey
Ankara
Turkish Lira
United Arab Emirates
Abu Dhabi
Dirham
Uzbekistan
Tashkent
Som (UKS)
Vietnam
Hanoi
Dong
Yemen
Sana
Riya (YER)
Countries with Capital and Currency of Europe
Country
Capital
Currency
Albania
Tirana
Lek
Andorra
Andorra-la-vella
Franc Pesta
Armenia
Yerevan
Dram
Austria
Vienna
Schilling
Belarus
Minsk
Manat
Belgium
Brussels
Belgian Franc
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Sarajevo
Konvertibilna Marka
Bulgaria
Sofia
Dinar
Croatia
Sofia
Lev
Czech
Zagreb
Koruna
Denmark
Copenhagen
Danish Krone
Estonia
Tallinn
Kroon
Finland
Helsinki
Marakka
France
Paris
Franc
Georgia
Tbilisi
Lari
Germany
Berlin
Deutsche Mark
Greece
Athens
Drachma
Hungary
Budapest
Forint
Iceland
Reykavik
Krona
Ireland
Dublin
Euro
Italy
Rome
Euro
Kosovo
Pristina
Euro
Latvia
Riga
Lats
Leichtenstein
Vaduz
Swiss Franc
Lithuania
Vilnius
Litas
Luxemburg
Luxemburg
Luxemburg France
Macedonia
Skopje
Dinar
Malta
Valletta
Maltese Lira
Moldova
Chisinau
Leu
Monaco
Monaco
French Franc
Montenegro
Podgorica
Euro
Netherlands
The Hague
Guilder
Norway
Oslo
Norwegian Krone
Poland
Warsaw
Zloty
Portugal
Lisbon
Escudo
Republic
Prague
Koruna
Romania
Bucharest
Lei
Russia
Moscow
Rouble
San Marino
San Marino
Italian Lira
Slovakia
Bratislava
Slovak Koruna
Slovania
Ljubljana
Tolar
Spain
Madrid
Peseta
Sweden
Stockholm
Krona(SEK)
Switzerland
Berne
Swiss Franc
Ukraine
Kiev
Karbovanets
United Kingdom
London
Pound Sterling
Vatican City State
Vatican City
Italian Lira
Yugoslavia
Belgrade
New Dinar
Countries with Capital and Currency of Africa
Country
Capital
Currency
Algeria
Algiers
Algerian Dinar
Angola
Luanda
Kwanza
Benin
Porto Novo
Franc (CFA)
Bostwana
Gaborone
Pula
Burkina Faso
Ouagadougou
Franc (CFA)
Burundi
Bujumbura
Burundi Franc
Cameroon
Yaoundi
Franc (CFA)
Cape Verde
Prala
Cape Verde Escudo
Central African Republic
Bangul
Franc (CFA)
Chad
N’D’ Jamena
Franc (CFA)
Comoros
Moroni
Comorian Franc
Congo
Brazzaville
Franc (CFA)
Djibouti
Djibouti
Djibouti Franc
Egypt
Cairo
Egyptian Pound
Equatorial Guinea
Malabo
Franc (CFA)
Eritrea
Asmara
Etheopian Birr
Gabon
Libereville
Franc (CFA)
Ghana
Accra
Cedi
Guinea
Conakry
Guinean Franc
Guinea Bissau
Bissau
Peso
Ivory Coast
Yamoussoukro
Franc (CFA)
Kenya
Nairobi
Kenya Shilling
Lesotho
Maseru
Loti
Liberia
Monorovia
Liberian Dollar
Libya
Tripoli
Libyan Dinar
Madagascar
Antananrivo
Malagasy Franc
Malawi
Lilongwe
Kwacha
Mali
Bamako
Franc (CFA)
Mauritania
Nouakchott
Ouguiya
Mauritius
Port Louis
Mauritius Rupee
Morocco
Rabat
Dirham
Mozambique
Maputo
Metical
Namibia
Windhock
Rand
Niger
Niamey
Franc
Nigeria
Lagos
Naira
Rwanda
Kigali
Franc
Senegal
Dakar
Franc
Seychelles
Victoria
Rupee
Sierra Leone
Freetown
Leone
Somalia
Mogadishu
Shilling
South Africa
Cape Town
Rand
Sudan
Khartoum
Pound
Swaziland
Mbabane
Lilangeni
Tanzania
Dar-es-Salaam
Shilling
The Gambia
Banjul
Dalasi
Togo
Lome
Franc
Tunisia
Tunis
Dinar
Uganda
Kampala
Shilling
Zambia
Lusaka
Kwatcha
Zimbabwe
Harare
Zimbabwe Dollar
Countries with Capital and Currency of North America
Country
Capital
Currency
Antigua and Barbuda
St. Johns
Dollar
Bahamas
Nassau
Dollar
Barbados
Bridgetown
Dollar
Belize
Belmopan
Dollar
Canada
Ottawa
Canadian Dollar
Costa Rica
San Jose
Colon
Cuba
Havana
Peso
Dominica
Roseau
Sterling
El Salvador
San Salvador
Colon
Grenada
St. George
Dollar
Guatemala
Guatemala City
Quetzal
Haiti
Port-au-Prince
Gourde
Honduras
Tegucigalpa
Lempira
Jamaica
Kingston
Dollar
Mexico
Mexico City
Peso
Nicaragua
Managua
Cordoba
Panama
Panama City
Balboa
St. Kitts and Nevis
Basseterre
Dollar
Trinidad and Tobago
Port-of-Spain
Dollar
United States of America
Washington D.C.
Dollar
Countries with Capital and Currency of South America
Country
Capital
Currency
Argentina
Buenos Aires
Austral (Pesu)
Bolivia
La Paz
Boliviano
Brazil
Brasilia
Cruzeiro
Chile
Santiago
Peso
Colombia
Bogotá
Peso
Ecuador
Quito
Suere
French Guyana
Koenne
Franc
Guyana
Georgetown
Dollar
Paraguay
Asuncion
Guarani
Peru
Lima
Nuevosol
Surinam
Paramaribo
Guilder
Uruguay
Montevideo
Peso
Venezuela
Caracas
Bolivar
Countries with Capital and Currency of Oceania
Country
Capital
Currency
Australia
Canberra
Australian Dollar
Fiji
Suva
Fiji Dollar
Nauru
Nauru
Dollar
New Zealand
Willington
New Zealand Dollar
Papua New Guinea
Port Moresby
Kina
Solomon Island
Honiara
Dollar
Tonga
Nukualofa
Panga


बुधवार, 3 अप्रैल 2013

National Counter-terrorism Centre (NCTC): Issues and Options


Going by the recent claims of Home Minister Sushil Kumar Shinde, NCTC would see the light of the day after next month’s Chief Ministers’ conference. Earlier attempts to set-up an umbrella body on counter-terrorism failed mainly because of opposition from states ruled by non-Congress parties. Their concern was that the idea of unilateral operations by the NCTC would infringe on the states’ powers and hurt the federal structure of the country. But, there was also another hurdle in the form of reservations about placing NCTC within the Intelligence Bureau (IB). These two issues have now been addressed: by taking out “operations part” of the NCTC and also by not locating the NCTC within the IB.
Way back in 2009, the then Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram had outlined his vision for “the broad architecture of a new security system that will serve the country today and in the foreseeable future.” His idea was to institute an umbrella body dedicated to counter terrorism on the lines of the American NCTC with control over intelligence, operations and investigation of all matters pertaining to terrorism. The NCTC’s goals, according to Chidambaram, “will include preventing a terrorist attack, containing a terrorist attack should one take place, and responding to a terrorist attack by inflicting pain upon the perpetrators”. The aim of NCTC, according to the former Home Minister Chidambaram, was to reduce the failures of busting terror modules to zero.
Even a die-hard critic would not question the need for NCTC. Response to threats should depend on their nature. Undoubtedly, India is one of the worst affected countries by terrorism and, in the recent period, it has witnessed more terrorist incidents than any other country in the world. India confronts varied forms of threats that range from militancy in Jammu & Kashmir, insurgency in the northeast of India, Left Wing Extremism in Central India, and jihadi terrorism threatening the hinterland. Then there are other threats, over and above the identified main forms, such as illegal migration, drug-trafficking, smuggling of counterfeit currencies, small arms proliferation, organised crime and cyber warfare. All these determine the nature of terrorism confronted by India. Yet, the country lacks a single overarching body dedicated to counter terrorism. The time limit for constituting the NCTC was initially set as end-2010, but is yet to see the light of the day. Now, the present Home Minister Sushilkumar Shinde has indicated his readiness “to tweak controversial proposals to break the impasse.” Any new counter-terrorism body would be a failure unless it is evolved based on consensus of all states of India.
To avoid duplication, Chidambaram wanted all related agencies involved in counter-terrorism (although they are part of different ministries) like Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), Intelligence Bureau (IB), Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), Aviation Research Centre (ARC), Multi-Agency Centre (MAC), Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), National Investigation Agency (NIA) to report to the proposed NCTC (under the Ministry of Home Affairs) on matters related to terrorism. However, there is an intense resistance to this “submission”. There is a pervasive fear that such an arrangement would lead to over-centralisation of powers in the Home Minister and the Ministry of Home Affairs emerging as “super ministry”.
Although the above apprehension is farfetched, it is the responsibility of the Center to convey in unambiguous terms NCTC’s focus i.e. “terrorism only”. It should be acknowledged that intelligence/investigation/security agencies have a far wider mandate than terrorism. Even on matters terrorism, the methodology of working would be cooperation and coordination and not subordination of one agency to the other. The final objective is to bring about synergy and cohesion in counter-terrorism efforts, by doing away with overlapping, duplications, bottlenecks and unnecessary hurdles. To achieve this objective, it is enough if NCTC functions as an umbrella organisation with representations from intelligence, investigation and security agencies. It should be in a position to integrate all instruments of national power, including diplomatic, economic, social, political, military, intelligence, and law enforcement to ensure unity of effort. It should happen at central, state and local levels. The tentacles of the NCTC should penetrate deep down upto district levels instead of being another top-heavy organisation.
It need not follow any international model – US, UK or European – but that which suits India’s capabilities and threats. It has to be innovative and proactive in its approach rather than defensive and reactive. ‘Prevention’ and ‘protection’ should be the main watch words. For this, the Centre should constantly monitor terror/militant groups, their support network, sponsors, sanctuaries, mode of operation, threat potential, and leadership and make periodic threat assessments for policy makers. In this regard, it can effectively use ‘Crime and Criminal Tracking Network System (CCNTS), National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID), Central Monitoring System (CMS) and Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI). Personnel for NCTC could be pooled from relevant intelligence, investigation and security agencies headed by the senior most experienced officer on rotation basis with simple command structure. In this way, turf wars could be avoided, with the potential and efficacy of the agencies maximised.
- See more at: http://www.vifindia.org/article/2013/april/01/national-counter-terrorism-centre-nctc-issues-and-options#sthash.BqjqFhLk.dpuf

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